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Many countries around the world have modified their legislation to allow child complainants 
of abuse to present their evidence-in-chief via pre-recorded videotape, or through closed-
circuit-television (CCTV), rather than through live testimony, which has been shown to be 
stressful for children. With this modification, many countries also allow for childrens’ 
videotaped evidence to be truncated for relevance or admissibility purposes. In the two 
experiments, we examined whether truncating testimony influenced how mock jurors rated 
the credibility of a 6-year-old child complainant when her testimony contained the primary 
core allegation only, or when the testimony was presented with either one or two additional—
but less plausible— allegations. We also examined how mock jurors rated the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. Contrary to what we predicted, we found that participants 
believed the child’s core allegation, regardless of whether or not it was presented with 
additional less plausible allegations. Moreover, jurors who read the transcripts containing 
multiple allegations of abuse were more likely to find the defendant guilty of the core 
allegation than were jurors who read the core allegation only. These findings suggest that the 
truncation of testimony may affect the outcome of a trial; however, more research is needed 
on the effects of truncated testimony on juror decision-making as we continue to try to make 
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When a witness appears in court, he or she testifies in front of a number of people 
including lawyers, the judge, and most importantly, the jury. New Zealand has an adversarial 
judicial system whereby there is a legal argument between two parties: the prosecution and 
the defence (Ministry of Justice, 2014). At trial, these two opposing parties present their 
arguments and their evidence to the judge and the jury. After a witness has provided his or 
her testimony in court, he or she is cross-examined by the opposing lawyer. The purpose of 
cross-examination is for the opposing party to scrutinise, challenge, and test the reliability of 
a witness’ evidence (Ministry of Justice, 2014). Once all the evidence has been heard, the 
jury or a judge must reach a verdict of guilt or innocence on the part of the defendant 
(Ministry of Justice, 2014).  
Since the 1960’s, there have been concerns about the way in which children were  
treated when they appear as witnesses in the criminal court in New Zealand (Bala, 1999; 
Bennett, 2003; Brennan & Brenham, 1988; Cashmore & Bussey, 1996; Cashmore & 
Trimboli, 2006; Eastwood & Patton, 2002; Gupta, 1994; Landstrom & Granhag, 2010; ; Law 
Foundation New Zealand, 2010; Pipe & Henaghan, 1996; Powell, Wright, & Hughes-
Scholes, 2011; Scott, 1994; Zajac, O’Neill, & Hayne, 2012). Traditionally, children provided 
their testimony to the court in the same manner as adults—by standing in the witness stand 
unshielded from the defendant and the jury while they were asked questions by both the 
defence and prosecution lawyer (Pipe & Henaghan, 1996). In addition, in cases involving a 
child witness, the judge was allowed to warn the jury at the start of the trial that because 
children are likely to fantasise and distort evidence, they should be suspicious of a child’s 
testimony (Pipe & Henaghan, 1996).  
Many decades of research have now shown that there are a number of problems with 
the way in which child witnesses were traditionally treated in the courtroom (Cashmore, 
1992; Davies et al., 1990; Flin, 1990; Hill & Hill, 1987; Murray, 1995; Ministry of Justice, 
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2014; Pipe & Henaghan, 1996; Tillet, 2011). Testifying in court is stressful for most people, 
but it can be particularly stressful for children, who often do not understand the process and 
may be intimidated by the formality of the proceedings (Bala, 1999; Cashmore, 1992; Davies, 
1992; Flin, 1990; Goodman, Taub, Jones, England, Port, Rudy, & Prado, 1992;  Hall & Sales, 
2008; Hill & Hill, 1987; Murray, 1995; Pipe & Henaghan, 1996; Powell et al, 2011; 
Underwager & Wakefield, 1992). In addition, it was not uncommon for there to be a long 
delay between the child’s initial allegation and the trial where the child was required to give 
evidence (e.g., Connolly & Read, 2006; Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers, & Rotherham 
2010; Klemfuss & Ceci, 2009; Lash, 1995). These long delays are likely to have a major 
effect on the quality of children’s testimony in court.  
In light of these issues, legislative changes in New Zealand over the last twenty years 
have put in place a number of special provisions in an attempt to improve the accuracy and 
quality of children’s evidence. Amendments to the Evidence Act 1989 included a provision 
that allowed children alleging sexual abuse to provide their testimony by alternative means 
(Evidence Amendment Act 1989). These alternative means included the opportunity for 1) a 
child’s pre-recorded forensic interviews to be played in court as his or her evidence-in-chief; 
2) a child giving evidence in the courtroom to do so behind a screen so that the defendant was 
blocked from the child’s line of sight; and 3) a child to give evidence in a room outside of the 
courtroom via closed circuit television (CCTV). The rules were different for children of 
different ages; children under the age of 12 could provide their evidence via pre-recorded 
videotape, while 12- to 17-year-olds could only use the CCTV option to provide their 
evidence. The Evidence Amendment Act 1989 also prohibited judges from warning the jury 
about the reliability of children’s testimony (Bala, 1999; Pipe & Henaghan, 1996). 
The exact protocol that was to be followed in these alternative interview methods was 
specified in the Evidence (Videotaping of Child Complainants) Regulations 1990. Children 
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were to be interviewed by specially trained interviewers from Child, Youth and Family 
(CYF), or the New Zealand Police (Ministry of Justice, 2014). The initial evidential interview 
was to be recorded on videotape, allowing the opportunity for the child to have his or her 
evidence at trial provided via this pre-recorded video instead of in person (Ministry of 
Justice, 2014). Recording the evidential interview and using it in court was intended to help 
protect a child’s memory from delays imposed by the traditional court process and also to 
remove the child from the stressful process of the trial itself (Davies & Noon, 1991; Murray, 
1995; Pipe & Henaghan, 1996).  
Following the passing of the Evidence Amendment Act in 1989, Emma Davies and 
her colleagues conducted a series of studies in the 1990’s examining how conditions had 
changed for child witnesses in New Zealand. They concluded that there was still much that 
could be done to aid children’s participation in the legal system (Davies, Henderson, & 
Seymour, 1997; Davies & Seymour, 1997). In 1996, a Working Party on Child Witnesses 
was also established to conduct an extensive review on the effect of the new provisions in the 
Evidence Amendment Act 1989 on how children were treated in the New Zealand criminal 
courts. The Working Party made a number of recommendations for additional improvements 
including that access to alternative modes of giving evidence should be extended to all child 
witnesses (not just those alleging sexual abuse), and to children of all ages. In 2006, the 
Evidence Act 2006 was passed and included this provision. 
It is important to note that children do not automatically have the right to give their 
evidence via alternative means. For cases involving child complainants, the prosecutor must 
apply to the court about the way in which the child will give evidence. In considering an 
application for a child complainant to give his or her evidence by alternative means, the 
Evidence Act 2006 specifies that the Judge must have regard for the need to ensure the 
fairness of the trial. However, Section 107(4) of the Act also specifies that there is a need to 
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minimise the stress on the complainant and to promote the recovery of the complainant from 
the alleged offence (Evidence Act 2006). It is not mandatory for the prosecutor to make an 
application for cases where a child is giving evidence as a witness (for example, providing 
evidence about witnessing a robbery), rather than as a complainant (giving evidence in a case 
where he or she is the victim). 
Although most children in New Zealand now give their evidence-in-chief via a pre-
recorded evidential interview which is subsequently played at the trial, provisions in the 
Evidence Act 2006 also allow children’s cross-examination to be pre-recorded. In reality, 
however, this very rarely occurs. An Issues Paper released by the NZ Ministry of Justice in 
2014 outlines the pros and cons of pre-recording all of a child’s evidence (evidence-in-chief 
and cross-examination).  The Crown Solicitor in Auckland is currently trialling this practice, 
but it is not yet commonplace across all district courts in New Zealand. 
The intention of the special provisions for child witnesses introduced to the New 
Zealand judicial system was to maximise the likelihood that a child will provide the most 
complete, accurate, and reliable evidence. Have these special provisions had the desired 
effect? In some respects, the answer is yes. A number of studies have shown that the ability 
to provide their testimony by alternate means reduces children’s stress of testifying compared 
to giving evidence directly in court (e.g., Cashmore, 1992; Davies, 1999; Davies & Noon, 
1991; Davies et al., 1995; Goodman Batterman-Faunce, Orcutt, Thomas, Shapiro, & 
Sachsenmaier, 1998; Landstrom & Granhag, 2010; Murray, 1995; Nathanson & Saywitz, 
2003; Saywitz & Nathanson, 1993). In an observational study of 93 trials, for example, 
Davies et al. (1995) showed that children’s ratings of their stress levels were lower for 
children being interviewed on tape than for those who were examined directly by prosecution 
lawyers. The findings of laboratory-based studies provide similar evidence for the benefits of 
testifying via alternative means. Researchers have found that children who testified in court 
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had higher self ratings of anxiety compared to the children testifying via CCTV (Goodman et 
al., 1998) or in a different room (Nathanson & Saywitz, 2003; Saywitz & Nathanson, 1993). 
In another study on the effects of alternative means on children’s stress, Landstrom 
and Granhag (2010) had 10- to 11-year-old children act as witnesses. These child witnesses 
were asked to complete a questionnaire about their experiences during the interview. 
Children were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale how nervous or calm they were during the 
interview, and on a 6-point scale, whether the interview was easy or difficult. Overall, 41% of 
the children reported that they were nervous, and 35% reported that the interview was 
difficult. There was a significant difference between the video and live conditions on 
children’s scores on the nervousness question; 56% of children in the live condition, 47% in 
the CCTV condition, and 19% in the video condition reported that they were nervous during 
the interview. Regardless of whether the children testified live, via CCTV, or on video, the 
most frequently reported explanation as to why the child was nervous was the presentation 
mode (59%). For example, children said they were nervous “because of all the people 
watching me while I was talking” (Landstrom & Granhag, 2010, p. 951). Finally, children in 
the live condition also reported the interview to be more difficult than did children in the 
CCTV and video conditions.  
In cases of sexual abuse involving children, there is usually no physical evidence or 
corroborating witnesses so the child’s testimony becomes the most crucial ingredient to the 
outcome of the trial (Conolly, Price, Lavoie, & Gordon, 2008; Pezdek et al., 2004).  For this 
reason, it is important to understand how jurors perceive the value and credibility of 
children’s evidence because the determination of credibility relies solely on juror perceptions 
of the child’s testimony.  With the changes to legislation allowing children to give evidence 
via pre-recorded video, what do we know about the effects of viewing children’s evidence 
from video on jurors’ perceptions of child witnesses? 
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Since the changes to the legislation, a number of studies have been conducted to 
ascertain the effect of video testimony on jurors’ ratings of witness credibility. Several 
studies have found that mock jurors’ credibility ratings of child witnesses are similar, 
irrespective of the mode by which the child’s evidence was presented (e.g., Goodman, Taub, 
Jones, England, Port, Rudy, & Prado, 1992; Goodman et al., 1998; Landstrom & Granhag, 
2010; Orcutt, Goodman, Tobey, Batterman-Faunce, & Thomas, 2001; Ross, Hopkins, 
Hanson, Lindsay, Hazen, & Eslinger, 1994; Swim, Borgida, & McCoy, 1993).   
In one of the first studies in which researchers examined the effect of mode of 
presentation on the perception of child witnesses, Ross et al. (1994) compared 300 mock 
jurors’ ratings of the guilt and credibility of a defendant, and the credibility of a child witness. 
Jurors watched a videotape of a simulated sexual abuse trial that included a 10-year-old 
witness accusing her father of sexual abuse. The witness testified either in court directly 
confronting the defendant, in court with a screen placed between the child and the defendant, 
or outside the courtroom via a video monitor. Ross et al. found that the mode used to provide 
the testimony did not have a significant impact on jurors’ conviction rates and the perceived 
credibility of the defendant did not differ across the experimental conditions. Moreover, the 
mode in which the child testified had no impact on the perceived credibility of the child. 
Landstrom and Granhag (2010) also found no significant relation between the mode of 
presentation and jurors’ perceptions of how convincing that child’s testimony was. Similarly, 
Orcutt Goodman, Tobey, Batterman-Faunce, and Thomas (2001) found that there was no 
difference in empathy ratings for the child or the defendant when the evidence was provided 
in court or via CCTV. 
Taken together, the research described thus far appears to indicate that videotaped 
testimony incurs no disadvantages relative to live testimony and may in fact incur several 
advantages (e.g., reduced delays and reduced stress). But other research has shown 
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differences in jurors’ perceptions of the credibility of child witnesses between the two modes 
of presentation. For example, a series of studies by Gail Goodman and her colleagues have 
shown that mock jurors rate children who testify via video as less confident, less honest, and 
less accurate (e.g., Goodman et al., 1992, 1998; Goodman Myers, Qin, Quas, Castelli, 
Redlich, & Rogers, 2006; Tobey, Goodman, Batterman-Faunce, Orcutt, & Sachsenmaier, 
1995; Landstrom, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2007). Goodman at al. (1992), for example, found 
that jurors perceived children who testified via videotape more negatively on a number of 
different dimensions: accuracy, honesty, believability, intelligence, confidence, and ability to 
differentiate between fact and fantasy compared to children who testified in open court. 
Similarly, Goodman et al. (1998) found that 5- to 6-year-old and 8- to 9-year-old child 
witnesses were seen to be less believable when they testified by video than when they 
testified live, despite the evidence given by video actually being more accurate. Landstrom et 
al. (2007) also found that observers rated children’s live evidence as more convincing than 
the same testimony shown via video.  
In Goodman et al.’s (2006) study, 12 5- to 7-year-old children participated in a play 
session where they were either touched or not touched by a confederate. The children in the 
touched condition were touched on their nose, neck, and bare stomach (target touches) by the 
confederate. Children were then interviewed; those who had been touched were asked to tell 
the truth, and those who had not been touched were told to claim that they had been. Each 
child then testified in the courtroom live or via video. Goodman et al. found that jurors rated 
children who testified in court as more credible and sympathised more with them than they 
did with children who testified on video.  
Researchers have also shown that when children’s testimony is provided on video, 
jurors are sometimes less likely to find the defendant guilty (Eaton, Ball, & O’Callaghan, 
2001; Goodman et al., 2006; but see Davies et al., 1995; Hanna et al., 2010). For example, 
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Swim et al. (1993) asked mock jurors to watch a videotape of a simulated sexual abuse trial 
in which an 8-year-old child witness testified in open court or via a video monitor. Swim et 
al. found that for three out of the four counts that the defendant had been charged with, there 
was no difference in participants’ conviction ratings as a function of condition. On the one 
count of criminal sexual assault in the first degree, however, participants in the open-court 
condition provided more guilty verdicts (48%) compared to participants in the video 
condition (30%).  
In a similar study, Eaton et al. (2001) asked 108 mock jurors to watch a simulated 
video-recorded trial of an 11-year-old girl who was accusing her father of sexual abuse. 
Participants watched one of three versions in which the child witness testified either in the 
courtroom, by video deposition (giving evidence in a room outside the court), or by video 
link (giving evidence on a courtroom video screen). Mock jurors rated a number of 
components of the child witness’ credibility (e.g., confidence), overall credibility, defendant 
credibility, and then gave their verdict. Eaton et al. found that the mock jurors rated the 
overall credibility of the child’s testimony significantly lower if it was given via video link 
than when it was either given in court or by video deposition. In addition, the defendant was 
rated guilty less often by mock jurors in the video conditions than in the courtroom condition. 
Given that the primary purpose of legislation enabling children to testify via 
alternative means was to reduce stress and anxiety so that they would be better able to 
provide complete and accurate testimony, why is it that jurors still tend to perceive witnesses 
giving evidence directly in the court room more favourably than witnesses giving evidence 
via videotape or CCTV? Research conducted by Davies et al. (1991) and Cashmore (1992) 
suggests that testimony via CCTV may result in a loss of emotional impact and immediacy. 
The loss of immediacy may distance jurors from the child and reduce the jurors’ empathy for 
the child. Similarly, Eaton et al. (2001) suggests that child witnesses who give testimony via 
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video link are considered less credible by jurors because the jurors have trouble seeing the 
child’s demeanour (e.g., subtle changes in emotion expression) compared to children who 
give evidence directly in court. 
Differences in children’s behaviour when testifying via alternate modes may also help 
to explain why videotaped or CCTV testimony is perceived more negatively compared to live 
testimony. For example, Orcutt et al. (2001) examined jurors’ ability to distinguish deceptive 
from truthful testimony when children testified live or via CCTV. In their study, a male 
confederate interacted with a 7- to 9-year-old child and during the interaction, he and the 
child made a video together. There were three defendant-guilt conditions. In the guilty 
condition, children were filmed displaying bare parts of their upper arm, belly button, and 
toes. In the not-guilty condition, children were filmed displaying their sleeves, belt buckles, 
and shoes. Finally, in the deception condition, children were also filmed displaying their 
clothing, but at a later point in time, the children changed their testimony about what 
happened. 
Three weeks after making the video, children testified in a mock trial. Mock jurors 
were told that the defendant had been charged with the crime of videotaping a child 
displaying bare body parts. Children in the guilty and not-guilty conditions were instructed to 
tell the truth about what happened, while children in the deception condition were asked to 
modify their testimony by saying that the defendant had filmed their bare body parts. Half of 
the children in each defendant-guilt condition testified live in open court; the other half 
testified via CCTV. Mock jurors were randomly assigned to a 12-person jury --- first they 
completed pre-deliberation questionnaires individually, then deliberated as a jury on a 
verdict, and finally, completed a post-deliberation questionnaire.  
Orcutt et al found that during the pre-deliberation phase, jurors rated children 
testifying via CCTV as being less accurate, believable, consistent, and confident than 
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children who testified live. Despite this initial difference in how children who testified live or 
via CCTV were perceived, during the post-deliberation phase, Orcutt et al. found that jurors 
were no better at detecting deception when children testified in open court compared to 
testifying via CCTV.  
In another study designed to explore the effects of CCTV on juror decision making, 
Landstrom and Granhag (2010) examined adults’ perception and honesty assessments of 
truthful and deceptive child witnesses. A total of 108 10- to 11-year-old children acted as 
witnesses in the study and 240 adults (65 males, 175 females) participated as observers. 
Children participated in one of two events. Children in the real event condition were 
instructed to post a letter in a mailbox just outside their school. On their way, a male 
confederate initiated conversation with them about which toy they thought his dog would 
like. Children in the imagined event condition listened to an adult read a description that 
contained details of the event in the real event condition, and children were asked to imagine 
the described event. Three weeks later, children were interviewed about the real or imagined 
event either live, via two-way CCTV, or on video. Each observer was randomly assigned to 
watch an interview with either a truth-telling child (i.e., one who had participated in the real 
event) or a lying child (i.e., one who had participated in the imagined event). The observers 
then completed questionnaires about the perception of the child’s statements, and the honesty 
of the child.  
Landstrom and Granhag (2010) found that children in the live condition were 
perceived in more positive terms than were children in the CCTV condition, and the children 
in the CCTV condition were perceived in more positive terms than were children in the video 
condition. There was no difference in observers’ accuracy between the presentation modes, 
nor between observers who watched children who were telling the truth and those children 
who were lying (see also Vrij, 2002). Landstrom and Granhag argued that in the live 
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condition, observers are temporally and socially closer to the child witnesses than they are for 
children in the CCTV and video conditions (vividness effect) which makes them view the 
child in more positive terms. That is, the closer the presentation mode is to the juror, the more 
positively he or she perceives the child witness.  
Overall, research has shown that when jurors rate the credibility of a child, their 
accuracy is often poor, and this is particularly true when children are testifying via alternative 
methods (Goodman et al., 2002). The research suggests that mock jurors are poor at assessing 
the honesty of children’s accurate, unintentionally false, or intentionally false eyewitness 
testimony (Leippe et al., 1992, 1993; Orcutt et al., 2001; Tobey et al., 1995). It is possible 
that jurors may be rating the child’s credibility on a number of other factors including 
characteristics of the child such as his or her age, gender, language ability, perceived honesty, 
suggestibility, perceived intelligence, and demeanour while the child is testifying (Bottoms, 
Golding, Stevenson, Wiley, & Yozwiak, 2007; Kulisek, 2014) , and characteristics of the 
allegations. Moreover, when observers only have access to a videotaped statement, it is even 
more difficult for them to assess a child’s honesty (Talwar & Lee, 2002; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & 
Lindsay, 2006) and their judgments about a child’s accuracy are often unrelated to the child’s 
actual accuracy (Goodman, Batterman-Faunce, Schaaf, & Kenney, 2002; Leippe, Manion, & 
Romanczyk, 1992).  
In summary, many countries make special provisions for child witnesses to provide 
testimony via pre-recording of their forensic interview. Although this practice makes children 
appear more relaxed and helps them to provide more complete and accurate accounts, 
research has shown that the effect of this practice on jurors’ perceptions of children’s 
credibility is mixed. Ironically, some studies have shown that mock jurors rate children who 
testify via video as less confident, less honest, and less accurate. Furthermore, when 
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children’s testimony is provided on video, jurors are sometimes less likely to find the 
defendant guilty. 
In addition to examining the effects of special provisions on child witnesses, it is also 
extremely important to consider what effect these provisions have on defendants’ rights. 
Although no one would disagree that there is a need to minimise stress on child complainants 
and promote their recovery from any alleged offence(s), there must also be regard for a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. The use of videotaped testimony, for example, may have some 
other unintended consequences, particularly for those accused of a crime. For example, in 
New Zealand, in Section 23E of the Evidence Act (2006), the Judge can explicitly exclude 
sections of videotaped evidence. In other words, portions of the interview can be shown to 
the jury without showing the entire interview. The decision to edit the testimony are made 
based on two factors: 1) whether the probative value of the content is outweighed by its 
potential to be prejudicial; and 2) whether the content is relevant to the proceedings 
(Mahoney, McDonald, Optican, & Tinsley, 2010). Similar provisions for providing only 
portions of children’s evidence also exist in other countries (e.g., England, Wales, Australia; 
McDonald & Tinsley, 2011).  
In practice, what this means is that during a trial, portions of a child’s pre-recorded 
evidential interview can be played to the jury without showing the entire videotaped 
interview; portions of the interview transcripts can be presented in the same way. Why should 
this matter? How could the elimination of some portions of the videotaped interview 
influence the ability of jurors to make a good decision regarding guilt or innocence? 
Research over many decades has firmly established that the way in which an 
interviewer questions a child has a significant impact on the accuracy of the child’s report 
(Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Zaragoza, Dahlgren, & 
Muench, 1992; Holliday & Hayes, 2001; Poole & Lindsay, 2001). There are typically two 
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types of questions asked when interviewing children; free-recall questions and direct 
questions.  With free-recall questions (e.g., “Tell me what happened, “ or “Tell me everything 
that you can remember”), the child is allowed to express everything that he or she remembers 
about an event in their own words. Children’s answers to these kinds of free recall questions 
are usually highly accurate, but they are also often very brief and do not contain sufficient 
forensic detail.  With direct questions, the child is asked about specific details of an event 
(e.g., “Was it dark outside?”).  Compared to free recall questions, direct questions usually 
elicit more detailed answers, however, the increase in amount of information reported often 
comes at the expense of accuracy. One reason for this decrease in accuracy is that direct 
questions can often be misleading which increases the chance of errors.  Misleading questions 
can include both leading questions (e.g., questions that contain details that the child has not 
already given, for example, “Who touched you?”) and suggestive questions (e.g., questions 
that make explicit suggestions to the child, for example, “He touched you, didn’t he?”) (Ceci 
& Bruck, 1995). 
There is now ample experimental evidence that poor interviewing techniques are 
detrimental to the credibility of children’s testimony. One paradigm that researchers have 
used to study the effects of poor interviewing techniques is the misinformation paradigm. In 
this paradigm, children witness a target event and are later interviewed about things they saw 
(neutral questions) and things they did not see (suggestive questions). This paradigm can be 
used to assess the extent to which children take on board the information provided in the 
suggestive questions, later including that information in their own account of the event (e.g., 
Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Zaragoza, Dahlgren, & Muench, 1992).  
In one study using this paradigm, Ackil and Zaragoza (1998) recruited participants of 
three different ages (first grade, third/fourth grade, and college age) and asked them to watch 
a clip from a movie.  The children were then asked questions about events that never 
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happened in the video. A week later, a memory test was conducted.  Ackil and Zaragoza 
found that participants of all age groups had developed false memories for previously 
fabricated details, reporting the details as though they had actually seen them in the movie. 
The finding that children will incorporate new details (commission errors) or altered details 
(change errors) into their memory reports following exposure to misleading information has 
been replicated in a large number of studies (e.g., Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Holliday & Hayes, 
2001; Poole & Lindsay, 2001). 
In a similar kind of study, Candel, Hayne, Strange, and Prevoo (2009) compared 7- to 
11-year-old children’s susceptibility to commission errors, omission errors, and change errors 
using a misinformation paradigm. They hypothesised that children would be more susceptible 
to information suggesting changes (change errors) than to information suggesting that new 
details were present (commission errors) or that old details were not (omission errors). 
Children watched a class presentation about China and were then individually interviewed 
about the presentation 3 days later. During the interview, children were asked a series of 
misleading questions which contained commission errors (e.g., ‘A part of the presentation 
was about schools in China, wasn’t it?’), omission errors (e.g., ‘The presenter didn’t tell how 
long the Great Wall of China is, did she?’), and change errors (e.g., ‘Chinese people write 
with letters, don’t they?’). One day after the interview, a new interviewer asked children for a 
free-recall account of the presentation (‘tell me everything you can remember about the 
presentation and about the presenter’), followed by a series of non-directive prompts (e.g., 
‘what else did the presenter do?’).  Next, children were given a recognition-memory test 
consisting of items that were correct (from the presentation) and items that were incorrect 
(these were items that were suggested during the suggestive interview). Three items referred 
to information that was contained in commission questions, three items referred to 
information that was contained in omission questions, and three items referred to information 
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that was contained in change questions. Children were instructed to say ‘correct’ to items 
containing correct information and ‘incorrect’ to items containing incorrect information. 
Candel et al. found that older children were more likely to answer the questions 
correctly than were younger children. Overall, younger children were more susceptible to 
suggestive questions than were older children and children were more likely to yield to 
omission and change questions than they were to yield to commission questions. Younger 
children were more likely to make recognition memory errors than older children. Children 
yielded to change items (i.e., answered ‘correct’) more often than to commission items or 
omission items. The results of this study provide evidence that the way in which children, 
particularly young children, are interviewed is crucial. Children, especially younger children,  
seem to be very prone to suggestion and are easily influenced to take on and report 
misinformation.  
In yet another study that was conducted to examine the influence of interviewers’ 
questioning on children’s accuracy, Poole and Lindsay (1995) examined 3- to 7-year-olds’ 
ability to recall details of an event in response to non-leading and misleading questions. 
These questions were asked after they had been provided with misinformation from their 
parents.  In the Poole and Lindsay study, children participated in a staged event with “Mr 
Science,” a confederate who gave a number of science demonstrations. Each child was then 
interviewed after participating in the science demonstration with neutral open-ended 
questions. Three months after the science demonstration, the children’s parents read them a 
story about Mr Science on three consecutive days. The story described two events that the 
child had experienced and two events that the child had not experienced. After hearing the 
story, the children were re-interviewed about the science demonstration. Children were asked 
both misleading and non-leading questions about the event. Children were also asked about 
the source of their memories (e.g., “Did mum/dad read you a story about Mr Science’s pulley 
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machine?”).  When they were initially interviewed using non-leading questions, children’s 
accounts of the science demonstration were highly accurate.  Three months later, children 
who were asked leading questions after they received misinformation from their parents made 
a large number of mistakes. When asked misleading questions about events they had not 
actually experienced, 94% of children incorrectly agreed about events they only heard about 
in the story, but that they did not actually witness. 
Even questions that simply require children to answer yes or no can be problematic. 
For example, Peterson and Biggs (1997) compared 2- to 13-year-old children’s “yes” and 
“no” responses when they were questioned about a stressful medical experience. In that 
study, children who had been hospitalised due to an injury that required medical attention 
were interviewed about their experience within a few days of the injury. During the 
interviews, children were asked free-recall questions, open-ended wh-questions (e.g., who, 
what, where, when), and some yes/no questions. Children’s reports were then compared to 
that from an adult witness to estimate the child’s accuracy. Most children were able to 
accurately answer wh-questions. Two- to 5-year-old children, however, were biased towards 
saying “no” when asked yes/no questions. When answering “no,” preschoolers’ accuracy rate 
was no greater than chance. The results from this study have implications for children’s 
testimony. This study provides support that the syntactic form of specific questions may have 
an influence on children’s responses. Other research has shown that some of the other 
dangers of questioning type on the accuracy of children’s responses are suggestion (e.g., Ceci 
& Bruck, 1993), and repetition of questions (e.g., Fivush & Schwarzmueller, 1995; Poole & 
White, 1991) 
What about the long-term effect of poor interviewing techniques on children’s 
testimony? In one study designed to answer this question, Gross, Hayne, and Poole (2006) 
examined the long-term effect of misleading questioning on children’s subsequent reports. In 
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that study, 5- to 10-year-old children visited the police station where the children viewed the 
jail cells, had their fingerprints and photo taken, and were shown a police car. Children were 
interviewed in two misinformation interviews two and four weeks later. During the 
interviews, children were given both true and false information about what happened at the 
police station. For one group of children, the interviewer described two events that happened 
and two false events that never happened. For another group of children, the interviewer drew 
and described the same four events. The third group of children were asked to draw and 
describe the four events themselves. Six weeks after the event, children’s memory for the trip 
to the police station was assessed during a final interview. In this interview, children were 
asked a free-recall question followed by a series of direct yes/no questions.  
Gross et al. found that, regardless of interview condition, during the misinformation 
interviews, it was rare for children to reject the interviewer’s suggestion that false events had 
occurred. Moreover, children who were given the opportunity to draw and describe the false 
events during the misinformation interview often gave detailed descriptions of these events, 
even though they did not happen.  During the final interview, children spontaneously reported 
details about the false events, even during free recall. When children were asked specific 
questions, children in all three groups repeated information that had been discussed with them 
during the misinformation interviews, and they also provided additional details about events 
that never happened.   
Taken together, the results of Gross et al.’s (2006) study again confirm that children 
are highly likely to accept suggested information when questioned in a misleading way. Their 
study also provided some of the first evidence that children may incorporate misleading 
information into their free-recall accounts of an event even when they are questioned 
appropriately in a subsequent interview. Gross et al. concluded that unless all interviews are 
free of misleading information, children may incorporate incorrect information into their 
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subsequent accounts of the same event (see also Ceci, Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994). 
Taken together, the results of all of the studies described above indicate that children can 
easily be misled to report false information about events they had seen or heard about. 
Although misleading questions alone are enough to cause errors in children’s reports, 
they are more detrimental when they are used in combination with other suggestive 
techniques. For example, Garvan et al. (1998) examined the combined effects of several 
interviewing techniques on children’s accuracy. The interviewing techniques used in this 
study mimicked the interview techniques that were used by interviewers in the McMartin 
Preschool case.  The McMartin preschool case is a highly publicized sexual abuse day care 
centre in America during the 1980’s. This case involved a number of staff members being 
accused of child sexual abuse after an initial allegation was made by a child. Many of the 
children attending the centre were subsequently interviewed, where 360 of them disclosed 
forms of sexual abuse that had been conducted on them. The techniques that were used by the 
interviewers were poor. The techniques included highly suggestive and leading questions, 
and gave the children opportunity to pretend or speculate about potential events.  
In Garvan et al.’s study, a male confederate, “Manny Morals” read a story to 56 3- to 
6-year-old children.  One week after listening to the story, half of the children were asked 
misleading questions and half of the children were asked misleading questions combined with 
additional interview techniques that were drawn from the McMartin Preschool case, 
including the interviewer praising the child, using positive reinforcement, and informing the 
child what other children had said about Manny.  Children who were interviewed with a 
combination of techniques made over three times more false allegations against Manny than 
did children in the misleading questions only condition (58% vs. 17%). Garvan et al.’s 
findings demonstrate that reinforcement, social influence techniques, and improper 
interviewing techniques can have a strong and immediate effect on children’s accuracy.  
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In another series of experiments, Waterman and colleagues examined the effect of 
‘open’ versus ‘closed’ questions on children’s responses to nonsensical questions and un-
answerable questions (Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2000, 2001, 2004). For example, 
Waterman et al. (2000) asked 5- to 8-year-olds a series of open-ended questions and closed 
yes/no questions, some of which were considered sensible (e.g. “What colour is a banana) 
and some of which did not make sense (e.g., “Will rectangles shout at lazy kettles?”). When 
children were asked sensible questions, both open and yes/no questions were answered 
equally well. When asked nonsensical questions, children rarely answered them if they were 
open, but 72% of children attempted to answer nonsensical yes/no questions.  The overall 
results from their 2000, 2001, and 2004 studies showed that children over the age of 5 
answered the yes/no questions appropriately when they were asked the sensible questions and 
the questions that were considered answerable based on the information given. However, 
when children were asked questions that did not make sense or that they could not possibly 
answer, they often incorrectly said “yes” in response to closed questions instead of saying 
that they did not know the answer. These studies provide further evidence that the type of 
questions that are asked to children and the context in which they are asked in have an 
influence on the accuracy of the child’s reports.  
Research on the relation between interviewers’ questions and children’s accuracy is 
relevant to the issue of video-recorded testimony in a number of different ways.  For 
example, the Court recognises the importance of asking appropriate questions and in the 
courtroom, lawyers are not allowed to ask leading questions (Section 89, Evidence Act 
2006); objections to leading questions asked in open Court can be made by the opposing 
counsel. In contrast, when children’s evidence is collected outside the courtroom (i.e., pre-
recorded), the opposing counsel is not present and cannot prevent the interviewer from asking 
leading questions. In addition, the current legislation allows Judges to explicitly exclude 
26 
 
sections of videotaped evidence, increasing the chances that jurors will not see a child’s full 
testimony. In this way, juries might be shielded from sections of the interview that contain 
inappropriate questioning.   
Excluding portions of a child’s testimony also raises another important issue. When 
only portions of the child’s evidential interview is presented to the jury, it prevents members 
of the jury from seeing portions of the interview in their original context. During an 
evidential interview, children’s accounts are not necessarily limited to reporting information 
specific to their core allegations; children may also report other information. Sometimes that 
additional information comprises tangential or unrelated information, but sometimes it also 
includes additional allegations that contain bizarre or implausible claims about what 
happened.  For example, Dalenberg (1996) examined 644 interviews of 3- to 17-year-old 
sexual abuse complainants.  She found that approximately 2% of the interviews contained 
bizarre or improbable claims. In one interview, for example, when a 3.5-year-old child 
reporting genital contact by a preschool teacher was asked, “Where were you?”, she 
responded, “In bed with mommy.” In another interview, a child claimed that she saw the 
alleged perpetrator torture and kill other children. 
The discussion of details that are of a bizarre or implausible nature could affect jurors’ 
perceptions of a child’s credibility. Bizarre and implausible claims are highly common in 
mass allegations of sexual abuse, including those involving daycare centres (Bruck & Ceci, 
1995; Linder, 2003; Peace, Brower, & Rocchio, 2014; Rosenthal, 1995; Schreiber et al., 
2006). For example, in the McMartin child care case, children claimed that they had watched 
a baby being beheaded and were made to drink the blood.  They also reported that they 
watched or participated in consuming excretions or semen, that they were taken into secret 
rooms, or that they watched animal sacrifices (Linder, 2003). Similar, bizarre allegations 
were also made against Kelly Michaels in the Wee Care Nursery School case.  In that case, 
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children made claims that Kelly raped and assaulted them with knives/swords, spoons and 
lego blocks, that she licked peanut butter off their genitals, made them drink her urine and eat 
her feces, amputated their genitals, and made them lick each other like cats (Bruck & Ceci, 
1995; Rosenthal, 1995; Schreiber & Parker, 2004).  Even though these types of details may 
not necessarily refer to the core charges in a trial, jurors would presumably consider this 
information when making a decision about a child’s credibility and believability. The effect 
of these types of details or the removal of these details on juror decision making is largely 
unknown.  
Although we know little or nothing about the effects of implausible or bizarre details 
on jurors’ evaluations of children’s testimony, there has been some, limited research on how 
these types of details influence jurors’ perception of adults’ testimony. For example, a study 
by Peace, Brower, and Rocchio (2014), mock jurors read an adult’s eyewitness statement 
about a mugging. The statement contained 5, 10, or 15 bizarre details; these details were 
mildly bizarre (e.g., the perpetrator wore dark red gloves), moderately bizarre (e.g., the 
perpetrator wore white gloves), or extremely bizarre (e.g., the perpetrator wore a baseball 
glove). Jurors then evaluated the credibility of the witness’s testimony by completing a 
perceived credibility questionnaire that contained questions relating to level of bizarreness, 
plausibility, belief in events as reported, witness credibility, and the bizarreness of specific 
details. As the bizarreness level increased, the perceived level of credibility of the witness 
decreased. Similarly, the more bizarre details the testimony contained, the less credible, 
believable, and plausible the witness and the evidence were perceived to be.  
The results from Peace et al.’s (2014) study suggest that, while the level of 
bizarreness plays a role in judgements about witness credibility, the number of bizarre or 
implausible details may be a more important determinant of truthfulness for jurors. In 
particular, an abundance of bizarre details leads individuals to doubt the story overall, rather 
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than strange details supporting one another. If few details are strange, acceptance of the 
witness as credible remains high (see also Vrij, 2008). This study supports the idea that 
people reject overly bizarre information as truthful (Peace et al., 2014).  
Do similar factors affect jurors’ evaluation of children’s evidence? What we do know 
to date is that when a child’s testimony is presented with the inclusion of the rapport building 
stage and questions pertaining to the child’s understanding of truth and lies, mock jurors 
evaluate the testimony differently compared to testimony that excludes these stages. In a 
study by Krahenbuhl (2012), mock jurors rated the child witness to be more credible and 
honest, and are more likely to believe the child’s allegation when the interview transcript 
contains the rapport building stage and the understanding between truth and lies.  
What we still do not know is how a child witnesses’ additional allegations, 
particularly those containing bizarre or implausible details influence jurors’ perceptions of 
the child’s credibility. We also do not know how jurors assess a child’s credibility when only 
portions of the interview are shown, or how jurors rate the guilt or innocence of the defendant 
under these conditions. For example, does showing only portions of an interview lead to more 
convictions or more exonerations? Similarly, is a child considered to be more believable 
when the bizarre claims are removed from the transcript, or vice versa?  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no research examining how jurors interpret 
segments of a child’s testimony in the absence of the context of the full interview, 
particularly when the child’s core allegations are presented against a backdrop of bizarre or 
implausible claims. Given this, the aim of the current study is to examine how mock jurors 
rate the believability of a child’s eyewitness testimony when that testimony is presented 
either in full, or has been truncated in a way that is currently allowable in New Zealand 
courts, as well as many courts around the world.  Specifically, we examined the effect of 
presenting only portions of a child’s transcribed testimony on jurors’ perception of the child’s 
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credibility as well as their impression of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. To do this, we 
asked mock jurors to evaluate a transcript that either contained a central core allegation only, 
or transcripts that included the core allegation in conjunction with one or more additional 
allegations that were less plausible. We hypothesised that jurors who read the transcripts that 








In New Zealand, anyone who is on the electoral roll and under the age of 65 is eligible 
for jury service. Given this requirement, we recruited participants aged 18 years and older to 
participate in this study. The final sample size was 64 (49 females; M age = 19.73 years; SD 
= 2.32). An additional two participants were excluded because they failed to demonstrate that 
they had thoroughly read, comprehended, and retained the information that was contained in 
their assigned transcript (see below). Participants were recruited from the Department of 
Psychology Year 1 and Year 2 Experimental Participation Pool, or via word of mouth. Pool 
participants satisfied a small portion of course credit by completing a worksheet based on the 
experiment; remaining participants were reimbursed with a movie voucher for their costs of 
participating. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in the laboratory. They were told that they would 
be asked to read a transcript of an evidential interview with a child, putting themselves in the 
role of a juror, and that they would then answer some questions from the experimenter before 
completing two computer-based questionnaires. 
Each participant then read the same background information about the case:  
Warren Smith is a 55-year-old cleaner [janitor] at a local primary school.  Warren 
has a mild intellectual impairment.  He works most days as part of a community-
based employment scheme.  He has worked in this particular school for almost a year 
and there have been no prior complaints about his behaviour.  He is charged with 
assault on a child.  The allegation was made by a 6-year-old, female child.  The child 
initially disclosed the alleged assault to her mother and was subsequently interviewed 
by a specialist interviewer for the police. 
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Next, participants read a transcript of a mock evidential interview that was conducted 
with a child complainant, Jasmine. Based on a corpus of transcripts from real evidential 
interviews with child complainants of abuse, we constructed four different interview 
transcripts for this experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four transcript 
conditions (n = 16 per condition). Each transcript began with a series of questions designed to 
establish that the child witness understood the difference between truth and lies, knew what 
making a promise meant, and promised to tell the truth.  This section of the transcript was 
926 words in length.  
Each transcript then included questions from the interviewer and responses from the 
child witness about the same core allegation—Jasmine alleged that Warren hit her on the leg 
in the school bathroom and that, as a result, her leg went purple. Following the core 
allegation, the transcripts differed according to the number and nature of additional 
allegations. 
1. For participants in the Core Only condition, the transcript concluded at the end of the 
core allegation (see Appendix 2A). 
2. For participants in the Core + 1 condition, the core allegation was followed by the 
additional allegation that Warren locked Jasmine in a cupboard at school along with 
two of her friends (see Appendices 2A and 2B). 
3. For participants in the Core + 2 condition, the core allegation was followed by the 
additional allegation that Warren drove Jasmine from school to a cave where some of 
his friends were dressed as wizards. While at the cave, they hit her with swords and 
sticks and took photos (see Appendices 2A and 2C). 
4. For participants in the Core + 1 and 2 condition, all three of the allegations were 
presented in the transcript in this order (see Appendices 2A, 2B, and 2C).  
To ensure that the questioning style used to elicit each of the three allegations was 
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equivalent, we balanced the number of open-ended, specific-open, and multiple-choice 
questions used to elicit each allegation. We also balanced the number of off-topic responses 
given by the child, and the number of minimal responses (e.g., umm or uh-huh), pauses, and 
instructions to speak up given by the interviewer. The allegations were also similar in length 
(Core Allegation: 545 words; Additional Allegation 1: 485 words; Additional Allegation 2: 
539 words).  
When the participant had finished reading the transcript, the experimenter began the 
one on one verbal interview phase. During this phase, participants were asked several 
questions about what they had read and made several judgements about the case. First, 
participants were asked three questions to ensure that they had thoroughly read, 
comprehended, and retained the information contained in their assigned transcript (i.e., “How 
old is Jasmine?”, “How many times was Jasmine allegedly assaulted?”, and “Whom did 
Jasmine first tell about the assault by Warren?”).  If they could not answer all of these 
questions correctly, they were excluded from the final sample. 
Next, participants were asked to render a verdict on each of the allegations in their 
assigned transcript. All participants were asked, Did Warren hit the child? Participants in the 
Core + 1 condition were also asked, Did Warren lock the child in a cupboard?  Participants 
in the Core + 2 condition were also asked, Did Warren take the child somewhere in a car?  
Participants in the Core + 1 and 2 condition were asked all three questions. After providing 
their verdict, participants rated how strongly they believed Jasmine’s allegation of physical 
assault on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all; 4 = Neutral; 7 = Very strongly). Finally, participants 
rated the overall likelihood that Warren committed the assault (1 = Extremely unlikely; 4 = 
Neutral; 7 = Extremely likely), and gave an overall confidence rating regarding Warren’s guilt 
(1 = Extremely confident that Warren is innocent; 4 = Neutral; 7 = Extremely confident that 
Warren is guilty). 
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Following the verbal interview, participants were seated at a computer and completed 
two final questionnaires. First, they were presented with a series of questions specific to the 
case. The questions were based on those used by Kulisek (2014) and were presented using 
MediaLab (Jarvis, 2012). First, using a 7-point scale (1 = very unlikely; 4 = neutral; 7 = very 
likely), participants answered a series of 18 questions regarding their views on the 
circumstances surrounding Jasmine’s allegation(s) (see Appendix 1). Next, participants used 
another 7-point scale (1 = low; 4 = moderate; 7 = high) to rate Jasmine on 11 characteristics: 
memory ability, language ability, innocence, ability to distinguish imagination from reality, 
emotional maturity, knowledge of right and wrong, obedience, honesty, confidence, 
likeability, and intelligence. 
Based on a reliability analysis conducted by Kulisek (2014), we used each 
participant’s responses to selected questions to calculate two scores reflecting participant’s 
perception of Jasmine’s credibility: an honesty score (combined mean of ratings for questions 
1, 15, 16, 18, and the rating of honesty) and a cognitive competence score (combined mean of 
ratings for questions 5-9, 11, and ratings of memory ability, language ability, ability to 
distinguish imagination from reality, knowledge of right and wrong, and intelligence).  
Finally, participants used a 7-point scale (1 = none; 4 = a moderate amount; 7 = a 
great deal) to rate how much contact they had with children, their personal experience with 
child physical abuse, as well as their knowledge about eyewitness memory/testimony. After 





Table 1 shows participants’ responses to the questions about their experience with 
children, child physical abuse, and eyewitness testimony. There were no significant 
differences between the transcript conditions in terms of participants’ experience or amount 
of contact they had with children, or how much knowledge they had about eyewitness 
testimony. A Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) with the Freeman-Halton extension
1
 indicated that 
the number of participants who indicated that they had personal experience with child 
physical abuse did not differ across the four transcript conditions (P = .188, FET).  
 
Table 1. 
Participants’ experience with children, child physical abuse, and eyewitness testimony in 
each condition (means and standard deviations where appropriate or number of 
participants). 
 Core Only Core + 1 Core + 2 Core + 1 & 2 
As an adult, how much 
contact have you had with 
children?* 
5.00 (.45) 5.06 (.34) 5.13 (.41) 4.88 (.38) 
Do you have personal 
experience with child 
physical abuse? 
6 out of 16 5 out of 16 4 out of 16 1 out of 16 
If yes, rate your personal 
experience* 
3.83 (.48) 3.40 (.40) 5.00 (.71) 1.00 (0) 
Rating of knowledge about 
eyewitness testimony* 
4.00 (.26) 2.94 (.31) 3.56 (.33) 3.50 (.32) 
* 1 = none, 4 = a moderate amount, 7 = A great deal 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of participants who rendered a guilty verdict to the 
allegations that were contained in their assigned transcript. Across all four conditions, the 
                                                          
1
 The Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test is used to analyse a 4 x 2 contingency table when 20% of 




majority of the participants believed that Warren was guilty of the core allegation—hitting 
Jasmine on the leg. In addition, participants were more likely to render a guilty verdict to the 
core allegation than they were to render guilty verdicts to either of the additional allegations, 
confirming that participants considered these additional allegations as less plausible.  
 
Figure 1. The number of guilty verdicts rendered to each allegation as a function of transcript 
condition in Experiment 1a. (n = 16 in each condition). 
 
Recall that the primary research question was whether the inclusion of additional, less 
plausible allegations influenced mock jurors’ evaluation of the core allegation.  To answer 
this question, we used Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) with the Freeman-Halton extension to 
compare the number of participants who rendered a guilty verdict to the question about the 
core allegation, Did Warren hit Jasmine?  Although this analysis did not reach conventional 
levels of significance (P = .063, FET), given that the pattern of participants’ responses was in 
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the opposite direction to what we had expected (see Figure 1), we investigated the differences 
between the transcript conditions further. Contrary to our hypothesis, participants in the Core 
+ 1 and 2 condition were more likely to render a guilty verdict to the core allegation (n = 15) 
than were participants in the Core only condition (n = 9; P = .037, FET). That is, the presence 
of two additional allegations—both of which contained details that were less plausible than 
those in the core allegation—increased the likelihood that participants rendered a guilty 
verdict to the core allegation. The number of guilty verdicts rendered by participants in the 
Core + 1 and the Core + 2 conditions were intermediate between these two extremes (ns = 
13 and 11, respectively) and were not statistically different from either (Ps ranged from .252 
to .716, FET). 
Next, we took a closer look at the pattern of responses for participants whose assigned 
transcripts had contained additional, less plausible allegations.  We asked the following 
question: if participants rendered a not guilty verdict to the additional allegations, how did 
they judge the core allegation? We found that 7 out of 16 participants in the Core + 1 
condition rendered a not guilty verdict to the allegation that Warren had locked Jasmine in 
the cupboard; of those 7 participants, 71% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation. 
Similarly, for participants in the Core + 2 condition, 10 out of 16 rendered a not guilty 
verdict to the allegation that Warren had taken Jasmine somewhere in the car; of those 10 
participants, 60% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation.  
Perhaps the most compelling data come from those participants whose assigned 
transcript contained the core allegation as well as both additional allegations. Ten out of 16 
participants in the Core + 1 and 2 condition rendered a not guilty verdict when asked if 
Warren had locked Jasmine in the cupboard, and of those 10 participants, 90% rendered a 
guilty verdict to the core allegation. In response to the allegation that Warren had taken 
Jasmine somewhere in the car, 11 out of 16 participants rendered a not guilty verdict; of those 
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11 participants, 91% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation. Finally, 9 out of 16 
participants rendered a not guilty verdict to both of the additional allegations, but of those 9 
participants, 89% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation.  In summary, across all 
conditions, participants were highly likely to render a guilty verdict for the core allegation, 
even when they rejected the additional allegations that were part of the same transcript of the 
same child’s testimony.   
In the final part of our analysis, we calculated a series of 4 (Transcript Condition) x 2 
(Core Allegation Verdict: Guilty, Not Guilty) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to examine 
the effect of these two variables on participants’ judgments of the child’s believability, 
honesty, and cognitive competence; the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt; and confidence in 
verdict. Regardless of the number or nature of the allegations contained in the transcripts, 
participants’ ratings on the questions assessing the child’s believability, honesty, and 
cognitive competence, the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt, or participants’ confidence in 
their verdict were similar. That is, there was no significant main effect of transcript condition 










Figure 2. Participants’ mean ratings on the questions assessing the child’s believability, 
honesty, and cognitive competence, the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt, or participants’ 




Figure 3 shows participants’ ratings on the questions as a function of core allegation 
verdict. Not unexpectedly, relative to participants who rendered a not guilty verdict to the 
core allegation, participants who rendered a guilty verdict believed Jasmine’s allegation more 
strongly (F(1, 56) = 75.31, p < .01, = .574), thought that it was more likely that Warren 
was guilty of the allegation (F(1, 56) = 11.84, p = .001,  = .174), were more confident that 
Warren was guilty (F(1, 56) = 41.80, p < .01,  = .427), and rated Jasmine as more honest 
(F(1, 56) = 20.57, p < .01,  = .27). In contrast, participants’ ratings of Jasmine’s cognitive 
competence did not differ as a function of core allegation verdict (F(1, 56) = 1.34, p = .252, 
= .023). There was no Transcript × Core Allegation Verdict interaction for any of the 


















Figure 3. Participants’ mean ratings on the questions assessing the child’s believability, 
honesty, and cognitive competence, the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt, or participants’ 
confidence in their verdict, as a function of core allegation verdict. 
 
In summary, we found that participants in all four transcript conditions indicated that 
they believed Jasmine’s core allegation against Warren. It appears that even when a child’s 
core allegations are presented against a backdrop of more implausible allegations, mock 
jurors still believe that something must have happened. In the present experiment, however, 
the core allegation was always presented to the participants first. Given this, it is possible that 
the order in which the allegations were presented to participants may have influenced the 
verdict that they rendered to the core allegation. In Experiment 1B, we presented participants 
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with a transcript that contained information about the additional allegations before the 







Participants were recruited in the same way as in Experiment 1A. The final sample 
comprised 16 participants (9 females; M age = 18.5 years, SD = 0.89). An additional 3 
participants were excluded because they failed to demonstrate that they had thoroughly read, 
comprehended, and retained the information contained in their assigned transcript.  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1A with the exception that we created a 
new transcript where the order of allegations was reversed so that for participants in the 1 and 
2 + Core condition, the transcript started with the information about the two additional 





Participants in Experiment 1B did not differ from participants in Experiment 1A in 
terms of their experience with children (M = 5.19, SD = .48) and knowledge of eyewitness 
testimony (M = 3.44, SD = .34).  One participant indicated that she had a moderate amount 
(rating of 5.00) of personal experience with child physical abuse.  
Figure 4 shows the number of guilty verdicts rendered to the allegations that were 
contained in the transcript. The data from Experiment 1A are also shown for comparison. As 
shown in Figure 4, participants in Experiment 1B—who read about the additional allegations 
before reading about the core allegation—were the least likely of all of the participants across 
both experiments to believe that Warren was guilty of the core allegation—hitting Jasmine on 
the leg. In addition, participants in the 1 and 2 + Core condition were as likely to render a 
guilty verdict to the core allegation as they were to render guilty verdicts to either of the 
additional allegations (albeit relatively rarely).  
As in Experiment 1A, we used Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) with the Freeman-Halton 
extension to analyse whether the number of guilty verdicts rendered to the core allegation 
differed according to the order in which additional allegations, if any, were contained in 
participants’ assigned transcript. We conducted a cross-experiment comparison by using the 
data from the 4 transcript conditions in Experiment 1A in the analysis. As shown in Figure 4, 
there was a significant difference in the number of participants who rendered a guilty verdict 
to the core allegation as a function of transcript condition (P = .019, FET). Participants in the 
1 and 2 + Core condition were less likely to render a guilty verdict to the core allegation (n = 
7) than were participants in the Core + 1 and 2 condition (n = 15; P = .0059, FET). That is, 
the order of presentation of the two additional allegations had a major influence on the 




Figure 4. The number of guilty verdicts rendered to each allegation in the transcript used in 
Experiment 1B. The data from Experiment 1A are shown for comparison purposes. (n = 16 in 
each condition). 
 
Analysis of participants’ judgments of the child’s believability, honesty, and cognitive 
competence; the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt; and confidence in verdict revealed a 
similar pattern of results to that described in Experiment 1A. That is, reversing the order of 
the allegations in Experiment 1b had no effect on any of the participants’ ratings 
(Believability: M =  3.69, SE = .28; Honesty: M =  3.03, SE = .18; Cognitive Competence: M 
=  3.41, SE = .13; Likelihood: M =  3.66, SE = .29; or Confidence: M =  3.84, SE = .34; cf. 
Figure 2).  
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As in Experiment 1A, we took a closer look at the pattern of responses for participants 
whose transcript contained the additional, less plausible allegations first. We asked the same 
question: if participants rendered a not guilty verdict for the additional allegations, how did 
they judge the core allegation? We found that 10 out of 16 participants rendered a not guilty 
verdict to the allegation that Warren had locked Jasmine in the cupboard; of those 10 
participants, 40% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation. In addition, 12 out of 16 
participants rendered a not guilty verdict to the allegation that Warren had taken Jasmine 
somewhere in the car; and of those 12 participants, 33% rendered a guilty verdict to the core 
allegation. For the 8 out of 16 participants who rendered a not guilty verdict to both of the 
additional allegations; 25% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation. 
In summary, we found that participants were much less likely to believe the core 
allegation when it appeared at the end of the transcript, after participants had read the 
additional allegations. It appears that the order of the presentation of the allegations may 





Experiment 2  
In Experiment 1A, regardless of whether participants had received information about 
a core allegation only or about additional allegations that contained less plausible details, the 
majority of participants indicated that Warren was guilty of the core allegation. In fact, in 
stark contrast to our original hypothesis, the greatest number of guilty verdicts to the core 
allegation were rendered by participants who received a transcript containing the highest 
number of less plausible details. That is, when a child’s core allegations were presented 
against a backdrop of less plausible allegations, mock jurors still appeared to believe that 
something must have happened.  We wondered, however, whether it was possible that the 
order in which the allegations were presented to participants may have influenced the verdict 
that they rendered to the core allegation.  To test this possibility, in Experiment 1B, we 
reversed the order of the allegations so that the core allegation was presented last. We found 
that order did make a difference; participants rendered significantly fewer guilty verdicts to 
the core allegation when it was presented last in the transcript. Thus in Experiment 1, mock 
jurors evaluated the veracity of the core allegation differently if it came after the additional, 
less plausible allegations.  
In Experiment 2, we assessed the generality of the findings of Experiments 1A and 1B 
by creating three new transcripts that contained additional allegations that varied with respect 







Participants were recruited in the same way as in Experiment 1. The final sample 
comprised 80 participants (49 females; M age = 19.94 years, SD = 2.76). An additional 14 
participants were excluded because they failed to demonstrate that they had thoroughly read, 
comprehended, and retained the information contained in their assigned transcript. Although 
all of these participants correctly answered the first 2 questions (i.e., “How old is Jasmine?” 
and “How many times was Jasmine allegedly assaulted?”), they all failed to answer the final 
question, “Whom did Jasmine first tell about the assault by Warren?” Because these 
participants still completed all phases of the experiment, we checked to see if their data were 
different from the data of participants in the final sample; however, we found no differences 
between included and excluded participants on any measure.  
Procedure 
To provide a point of comparison, we retained the original core allegation from 
Experiment 1.  We then constructed two new additional allegations that were taken directly 
from real evidential interviews with child complainants of abuse. With the exception of 
identifying information, these allegations were presented exactly as they had appeared in the 
transcripts of the original evidential interviews.  
1. For participants in the Core Only condition, the transcript concluded at the end of the 
core allegation (see Appendix 2A). 
2. For participants in the Core + 1 condition, the core allegation was followed by an 
additional allegation that Warren made Jasmine get in the bath with him, telling her that 
he would make her do it by getting her undressed. Jasmine also alleged that, while they 
were in the bath, Warren forced her to eat her “poos” (see Appendices 2A and 3A).  
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3. For participants in the Core + 2 condition, the core allegation was followed by an 
additional allegation that Warren took Jasmine to another location. During the 
interview, Jasmine changes her story from saying that Warren took her to a library 
building to saying that Warren took her to his mother’s house or to his grandmother’s 
house, and that Warren’s friend’s mother and grandmother were present. Jasmine also 
alleged that Warren locked her in a trapdoor and stuck burning paper and a stick up her 
bottom, and that 20 of his friends were there (see Appendices 2A and 3B).  
4. For participants in the Core + 1 and 2 condition, all three of the allegations were 
presented in the transcript in this order (see Appendices 2A, 3A, and 3B).  
5. For participants in the 1 and 2 + Core condition, the three allegations were presented in 
the reverse order (as in Experiment 1B). 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1. Participants 
were asked to render a verdict on each of the allegations in their assigned transcript. 
Immediately after rendering each verdict, they were asked to describe why they had made 
that decision and to rate their confidence in that verdict on the same 7-point scale used in 





Table 2 shows participants’ responses to the questions about their experience with 
children, child physical abuse, and eyewitness testimony. As in Experiment 1, there were no 
significant differences on these demographic questions as a function of transcript condition.   
 
Table 2. Participants’ experience with children, child physical abuse, and eyewitness 
testimony in each condition (means and standard deviations where appropriate or number of 
participants). 
 Core Only Core + 1 Core + 2 Core + 1 & 
2 
1 & 2 + 
Core 
As an adult, how much 
contact have you had 
with children?* 
5.25 (.39) 5.62 (.35) 4.87 (.45) 4.31 (.51) 4.63 (.34) 
Do you have personal 
experience with child 
physical abuse? 
1 out of 16 6 out of 16 3 out of 16 2 out of 16 3 out of 16 
If yes, rate your 
personal experience* 
3.00 (0) 5.00 (.81) 3.33 (.88) 7.00 (0) 4.67 (1.20) 
Rating of knowledge 
about eyewitness 
testimony* 
4.31 (.30) 4.13 (.38) 3.19 (.38) 3.44 (.29) 3.56 (.30) 
* 1 = none, 4 = a moderate amount, 7 = A great deal 
 
Figure 5 shows the number of participants who rendered a guilty verdict to the 
allegations that were contained in their assigned transcript. As in Experiment 1, irrespective 
of transcript condition, the majority of the participants rendered a guilty verdict to the core 
allegation. In addition, participants were much more likely to render a guilty verdict to the 
core allegation than they were to render guilty verdicts to either of the additional allegations, 





Figure 5. The number of guilty verdicts rendered to each allegation as a function of transcript 
condition in Experiment 2. (n = 16 in each condition). 
 
As in Experiment 1, we used Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) with the Freeman-Halton 
extension to analyze whether the number of guilty verdicts rendered to the core allegation 
differed according to which additional allegations, if any, were contained in participants’ 
assigned transcript. As shown in Figure 5, there was no significant difference in the number 
of participants who rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation as a function of transcript 
condition (P = .755, FET), nor did transcript condition affect participants’ confidence in that 





Figure 6. Participants’ mean confidence rating of their core allegation verdict, as a function 
of transcript condition. 
 
We also examined participants’ confidence ratings for the verdicts that they rendered 
to the additional allegations and found no difference as a function of transcript condition 
(mean confidence ratings for the allegation that Warren made Jasmine take a bath with him 
and eat her ‘poos’ ranged from 2.69 to 3.50, F(2, 45) = 1.65, p = .20,  = .07; and for the 
allegation that Warren had taken Jasmine to the library and then to another location, where he 
locked her in a trapdoor and stuck burning paper and a stick up her bottom, the mean 







Next, we took a closer look at the pattern of responses for participants whose assigned 
transcripts had contained additional allegations.  In the Core + 1 condition, 13 out of 16 
participants rendered a not guilty verdict to the ‘bath’ allegation; of those 13 participants, 
46% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation. In the Core + 2 condition, 12 out of 16 
participants rendered a not guilty verdict to the ‘burning paper and stick’ allegation; of those 
12 participants, 67% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation. Eight out of 16 
participants in the Core + 1 and 2 condition rendered a not guilty verdict to the ‘bath’ 
allegation; of those 8 participants, 75% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation. Eight 
out of 16 participants also rendered a not guilty verdict to the ‘burning paper and stick’ 
allegation, and of those 8 participants, again, 75% rendered a guilty verdict to the core 
allegation. Interestingly in the 1 and 2 + Core condition, 9 out of the 16 participants rendered 
a not guilty verdict to the ‘bath’ allegation; of those 9, 44% rendered a guilty verdict to the 
core allegation. Twelve out of the 16 participants rendered a not guilty verdict to the ‘burning 
paper and stick’ allegation; of those 12, 42% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation. 
In addition 7 out of the 16 participants rendered a not guilty verdict to both additional 
allegations; of those 7, 29% rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation.  
Again, we used 4 (Transcript Condition) x 2 (Core Allegation Verdict: Guilty, Not 
Guilty) ANOVAs to examine whether participants’ ratings of the child’s honesty and 
cognitive competence differed according to transcript condition or to the verdict rendered to 
the core allegation. Participants in the Core Only condition rated Jasmine as being more 
honest (M = 4.45, SE = .20) than did participants in the four other transcript conditions (mean 
ratings ranged from 3.30 to 3.79; F(4, 70) = 5.25, p = .001,  = .23), and participants who 
rendered a guilty verdict to the core allegation rated Jasmine as being more honest (M = 3.97, 
SE = .11) than did participants who rendered a not guilty verdict to the core allegation (M = 







Experiment 1, participants’ ratings of Jasmine’s cognitive competence did not differ as a 
function of transcript condition or core allegation verdict, nor was there an interaction (largest 
F(1, 70) = 2.81, p = .10, = .04). 
In summary, we found that participants in all five transcript conditions indicated that 
they believed Jasmine’s core allegation against Warren. These results appear to be the same 
as the results from Experiment 1A, i.e., that even when a child’s core allegations are 
presented with allegations that sound more implausible, mock jurors still believe that 
something must have happened. The results differ from Experiment 1B in that in Experiment 









The overarching goal of the present study was to determine how mock jurors evaluate 
a child complainant’s credibility and a defendant’s guilt when that child’s core allegation is 
presented alone or against a backdrop of additional allegations that include improbable or 
bizarre details.  In two experiments, participants evaluated transcripts of simulated testimony.  
Some jurors considered only the core allegation (that the defendant hit the child in the school 
toilets) or they considered that allegation in conjunction with other allegations that included 
both physical (Experiment 1) or sexual (Experiment 2) abuse.  Although most of the 
participants did not believe that the defendant was guilty of the allegations that contained 
improbable or bizarre details, they did believe that he was guilty of the core allegation.  Much 
to our surprise, participants who were presented with allegations containing bizarre details 
did not use that information to alter their view of the defendant’s guilt regarding the core 
allegation or of the child’s overall credibility.     
Why might this be the case? One possibility is that jurors’ decision-making was 
focused primarily on the age of the child complainant, and that her young age enhanced 
jurors’ willingness to believe the core allegation, irrespective of the other, less plausible 
claims she made. Research has shown that a child’s age is one of the most influential factors 
in how mock jurors perceive the credibility of child witnesses. In sexual abuse cases, children 
who are younger than 12 years of age are typically perceived as more credible than 
adolescent and adult victims (Myers et al., 1999; Nightingale, 1993). When asked why, mock 
jurors often report that young children lack the cognitive ability and sexual knowledge that is 
typically needed to make a false allegation (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Bottoms et al., 
2007; Duggan et al., 1989; Gabora, Spanos, & Joab 1993; Goodman, Bottoms, Hersocvici, & 
Shaver, 1989; Nightingale, 1993). For example, Bottoms et al. (2007) found that younger 
children were perceived as more honest when they alleged sexual abuse due to their lack of 
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sexual knowledge.  This finding is not uncommon.  For example, other research has shown 
that mock jurors found a 6-year-old victim to be more credible than a 14-year-old victim 
(Bottoms & Goodman, 1994) and 5-year-old victim to be more credible than a 10- or 15-
year-old victim (Davies & Rogers, 2009).  In cases that emphasise trustworthiness and 
honesty, younger children may be perceived as more credible because they are viewed as 
more honest and trustworthy than older children on the basis of the assumption that they lack 
the cognitive capacity needed to tell a lie (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Connolly et al., 2010; 
Nightingale, 1993).  
In another study of this kind, Nightingale (1993) reported an inverse relationship 
between age and credibility.  That is, as a sexual abuse victim’s age increased, jurors’ 
perceived credibility of that victim decreased. Wright et al. (2010), for example, investigated 
the perceived honesty of 3- to 18-year-old children. Wright et al. found that both age and 
gender affected the perceived honesty of the children. For both boys and girls, participants 
believed that honesty increased until ages 5 to 6. After age 6, participants perception of boys’ 
honesty began to decrease, while their perceived honesty of girls only started to decrease at 
approximately 10- to 11-years-old (see also Nunez et al., 2011). Researchers have also 
reported that mock jurors view younger children as more honest than older children, and also 
as more sexually naïve and lacking the knowledge and cognitive ability to make up such 
experiences (Bottoms, 1993; Bottoms et al., 1994, 2007; Nightingale, 1993; Ross et al., 
2003).   
Consistent with past research, some of the participants in the present study used the 
child complainant’s age to justify their decision regarding the credibility of the core 
allegation. For example, some jurors said: “why would a child make it up”, “she’s only 6”, 
“kids are pretty truthful”, “too much detail for a child to make up”, “she’s young, she 
wouldn’t be able to make up these stories”, “weird thing for a 6 year old to make up”, 
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“details in there that you wouldn’t expect a child to know”. In fact, across all the transcript 
conditions, the most common reasons that mock jurors provided for rendering a guilty verdict 
were the child’s age and her perceived honesty. Ironically, perhaps, when it comes to some 
allegations, a child’s limited cognitive ability increases their perceived credibility (Ross, 
Dunning, Toglia, & Ceci, 1990).           
In addition to the child complainant’s age, there are other reasons why participants 
may have continued to believe the core allegation even when they did not believe the other, 
less plausible allegations.  One of those reasons involves participants’ perception of the 
child’s  demeanour. Research has shown that a witness’ demeanour can have a powerful 
effect on jurors’ determination of that witness’ credibility. Demeanour is an individual’s 
outward behaviour including facial expressions, voice intonation, and displays of emotion 
(e.g., crying).  In the courtroom, a child may cry a little, cry hysterically, or not cry at all 
while providing their testimony. Kaufmann, Drevland, Wessel, Overskeid, and Magnussen 
(2003) have argued that jurors’ credibility ratings are influenced more by the complainant’s 
emotions and/or behaviours than by the facts contained in his or her testimony. For example, 
Regan and Baker (1998) asked participants to read a courtroom scenario of a 6-year-old girl 
who accused her father of sexual abuse. When participants were asked to indicate what 
behaviour they would expect the child to show while testifying, crying was reported most 
often.  In a second experiment in the same study, a new group of participants read the same 
scenario that was used in the first experiment, but they were told that the child was either 
calm or crying. Regan and Baker found that more guilty verdicts were delivered in the crying 
condition than in the calm condition. The child in the crying condition was judged to be more 
honest, credible, accurate, and reliable.  
In a similar study, Golding et al. (2003) asked participants to read a criminal trial 
summary of sexual assault on a 6- or 15-year-old victim. The victim was described as calm, 
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teary-eyed, or hysterically crying. Again, more guilty verdicts were rendered, and there was 
greater victim believability in the teary-eyed condition relative to the calm and hysterically-
crying condition. Taken together, these results suggest that too little or too much emotion 
from the victim negatively affects their perceived credibility in the eyes of mock jurors. 
Research has also shown that the outcome of a trial is significantly influenced by the 
demeanour of children who testify in court, especially in cases of suspected sexual abuse 
(Golding, Dunlap, & Hodell, 2009).  
In the present study, participants could not physically see the child testifying. Despite 
the lack of opportunity to directly observe her, their reasons for believing her included 
statements about her demeanour: “she seemed genuine”, “she was quite upset”, “she cried”. 
These results are consistent with the research described above showing that the child’s 
demeanour influences his or her believability. This finding is particularly true in cases of 
suspected sexual abuse which might also explain why there were a higher number of guilty 
verdicts for the child’s allegations in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. 
Another potential explanation for our mock jurors’ consistent belief in the core 
allegation is the nature of the questioning by the interviewer. When participants believed the 
child’s allegation(s), they sometimes referred to the interviewer’s questioning style: “ the 
questions were not leading”, “there was no persuasion from the interviewer”, “no ideas 
were put in her head”, “no words were put in her mouth”. Even though some participants 
correctly noted that the questioning style used by the interviewer was not leading, this fact 
alone does not necessarily mean that Jasmine’s testimony was accurate. What these mock 
jurors failed to appreciate is that there are a number of different ways in which testimony can 
become contaminated prior to the interview itself. For example, if an interview is conducted 
using best practice standards (i.e., no leading questions etc), the only conclusion that can be 
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drawn is that the interviewer did not make the testimony less accurate; we cannot conclude 
that it is free from contamination.   
Researchers have shown that when exposed to misinformation about a prior 
experience, children will report that misinformation, even during free recall, which is 
understood to be best interviewing practice in forensic interviews (Sutherland & Hayne, 
2001; Zajac & Hayne, 2003). For example, in Sutherland and Hayne (2001), 11- to 12-year-
old children and adults watched a short video clip either individually (immediate-retention 
condition) or in groups of 2 to 4 (delayed-retention condition).  Immediately after watching 
the clip, participants completed a questionnaire about the video. Participants were then 
interviewed either 1 day or 6 weeks after watching the video. During this interview, they 
were exposed to neutral, leading, and misleading postevent information. The participants then 
completed the memory test individually 1 day after the postevent information session. The 
interviewer asked questions in a free recall manner until the participants could not add any 
additional information to the conversation. At this stage of the interview, the interviewer 
asked direct (but not misleading) questions. Sutherland and Hayne found that adults provided 
more information than children, but relevant to the present study, children reported more of 
the misleading postevent information during free recall. Thus, even under ideal questioning 
conditions, children reported misinformation that they had encountered prior to the interview. 
Another potential explanation for our finding that participants maintained their guilty 
verdicts in light of additional bizarre and implausible allegations is that the core allegation 
was highly detailed and jurors interpreted these details as a sign of truth.  Research has 
clearly established that jurors equate highly-detailed accounts with truth telling, irrespective 
of the age of the witness (e.g., Bell & Loftus, 1985; Klettke & Powell, 2011).  In studies 
conducted specifically with children, prior research has shown that the number of details that 
a child reports influences jurors’ perception of the child’s credibility (Yozwiak, Golding, & 
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Marsil, 2004). The findings of the present study are consistent with past research; the detailed 
nature of the child’s report was one of the most common reasons that mock jurors provided 
for rendering a guilty verdict. Here, the age of the child links to the amount of detail reported 
as participants report that there is, “too much detail in there for a child to make up”. 
A final explanation for why the mock jurors in the present study may have ignored the 
unusual or bizarre claims in the additional allegations may be the fact that there were multiple 
allegations of abuse. Because the child complainant described more than one event, 
participants may have inferred that something must have happened, and hence made the 
decision to convict the defendant of the most plausible allegation. This explanation is 
consistent with research which has examined jurors’ perceptions of a child’s credibility using 
single vs repeated events of abuse. Two particular studies used Criterion Based Content 
Analysis (CBCA), which is a method that researchers and psychological and legal 
professionals use to analyze children’s statements for the presence of features associated with 
truthful accounts. The CBCA system is the core component of Statement Validity 
Assessment (SVA), commonly used as an honesty assessment technique in forensic settings. 
The SVA technique came about because, in cases of abuse, it is difficult to assess the validity 
of the abuse when often the only witness is the victim. CBCA systematically assesses the 
truthfulness of a witnesses’ spoken testimony of events. CBCA does this by analyzing the 
content of the child’s allegations to detect specific content items (referred to as criteria) that 
have been hypothesised by Undeustch (1982) and Kohnken (1989) to be signs of the truth. 
The 18 criteria items are applied to the content of a child’s statement and it then gives a 
probability estimate of the statement’s honesty. If a criteria item is present, it is considered to 
be an indicator of the truthfulness of the child. It is important that the child’s age, experience, 
and skill level is taken into consideration when applying the criteria (e.g., children may not be 
able to provide as much detail of an event, and detail is one of the CBCA criteria). 
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Using the CBCA system, Pezdek et al. (2004) and Stromwall, Bengtsson, Leander, 
and Granhag (2004) found that CBCA scores were higher for child complainants who 
described multiple instances of abuse than for those who described a single instance of abuse. 
This finding suggests that allegations of repeated abuse may be more believable than 
allegations of single events.  
In another study, Pozzulo et al. (2010) investigated the relation between multiple 
allegations and jurors’ perceptions of a child’s credibility. Jurors were found to be more 
confident in their verdict when the abuse was repeated.  This finding indicates that mock 
jurors may consider that “more” is worse and “more” is believable (see also Golding et al., 
1999) because the victim would be less likely to have misunderstood the situation if the abuse 
happened more than once. Applying this reasoning to the present study, it may be that when 
participants were presented with multiple allegations of abuse, they believed that the 
defendant must be guilty of something, and so they convicted him on the allegation that 
seemed most plausible.  The participants also reported that the information in the child 
complainant’s core allegation was consistent, the complainant did not contradict herself, and 
the details sounded feasible and plausible. These explanations were often provided by 
participants for why they convicted the defendants on the child’s core allegation but not on 
the child’s additional allegation(s).   
The only condition that supported our prediction that jurors who read the transcripts 
that contained less plausible allegations would have a more negative perception of the child’s 
credibility was in Experiment 1B. Recall that in Experiment 1B, we changed the order of the 
allegations so that the core allegation was presented last. Most of the participants in this 
experiment rendered a not guilty verdict to all of the child complainant’s allegations. That is, 
presentation of the less plausible allegations first, influenced participants’ decision on the 
core allegation. When this procedure was replicated in condition 5 of Experiment 2, however, 
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there was no effect. Why might this be the case?  Recall that the additional allegations in 
Experiment 2 had more explicit details and these details were of a highly unusual sexual 
nature. It is possible that participants used their preconceived ideas about young children’s 
lack of sexual knowledge as the overriding factor in making their final determination 
regarding the defendant’s guilt (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Bottoms et al., 2007; Duggan et 
al., 1989; Gabora, Spanos, & Joab 1993; Goodman, Bottoms, Hersocvici, & Shaver, 1989; 
Nightingale, 1993). Clearly, the interaction between allegation order and allegation content is 
an area for further research.   
It is important to note that the bulk of the conclusions from this study are based on 
null results. That is, there was no difference in participants’ view of the core allegation 
whether it was presented alone or in conjunction with other, implausible allegations.  At the 
same time, however, this same basic finding was replicated multiple times with different 
allegations and the same effect was obtained.  Across all of the experiments, there were 7 
replications of the same effect. The strength of this repeated finding suggests there are robust 
effects in decision making among the participants of our study when a decision of guilt or 
innocence is made.  It is important that studies can be replicated, as studies that are able to be 
reproduced have a lot of strength to their findings. Even though our findings require us to 
accept the null hypothesis, the replication of this finding lends substantial credibility to the 
conclusions (see also Nuzzo, 2015; Wells & Windschitl, 1999). 
At least two aspects of our procedure may have had additional bearing on the results.  
For example, our sample consisted of primarily female participants. Prior research has shown 
that females are more likely to exhibit a pro-victim/pro-prosecution bias in their judgements 
relative to males. This pattern is particularly strong in cases that involve child sexual abuse. 
In these cases, women’s judgements typically involve a higher number of guilty verdicts and 
their rating of the believability of the child is higher than those of men (Bottoms et al., 2007; 
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Quas, Bottoms, Haegerich, & Nysse-Carris, 2002; Redlich, Myers, Goodman, & Qin, 2002; 
Ross, Hansen, Lindsey, Eslinger, & Hazen, K, 1994; Schutte & Hosch, 1997). In future 
research, it would be ideal to specifically examine the effect of gender differences on jurors’ 
decision-making using our stimuli.  At the same time, however, there is no provision to 
balance the gender composition of juries in actual trials—so the practical implications of the 
findings might be somewhat limited. 
In addition, our participant sample was made up of university students who were 
mainly psychology undergraduates. Most of the participants in the sample were 18- to 20-
years old. Although this sample would be considered to be younger and potentially more well 
educated than would be an average jury, studies have rarely found that undergraduate 
students and community members significantly differ in their ratings of child credibility 
(Bornstein, 1999; Connolly et al., 2008; Quas et al., 2005).   
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to examine how truncating 
testimony affects mock jurors’ perception of a child’s credibility and the believability of their 
allegations. The study has provided a solid foundation for future research. For example, we 
are currently exploring the effect of this manipulation on juror decision-making when the 
child’s testimony is presented via pre-recorded videotape.  In addition, we are also comparing 
the effects of this manipulation on juror decision-making when they are asked to consider the 
complainants’ allegations as a group, rather than individually, which is what would happen in 
an actual trial.   
Finally, we are also exploring the effects of cross-examination on jurors’ decision-
making using the present series of allegations.  Recall that when a trial goes to court, 
witnesses are cross-examined by the opposing lawyer. The purpose of cross-examination is 
for the opposing party to scrutinise, challenge, and test the reliability of a witness’ evidence 
(Ministry of Justice, 2014). The goal of cross-examination is to discredit the witness; the 
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opposing lawyer often accuses the witness of being dishonest, and uses leading and 
suggestive and complex questions. Child witnesses have expressed the view that cross-
examination is the most distressing and frightening part of the trial (Eastwood & Patton, 
2002) and research has shown that cross-examination does not necessary uncover the truth in 
children’s testimony (Zajac et al., 2003; Zajac & Cannan, 2009; Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 
2003).  Despite this, we know that cross-examination does influence juror decision-making.  
The key question for future research is whether jurors would hold a different view about our 
child complainant’s allegations, if they were also exposed to her responses to cross-
examination?   
Taken together, the findings of the present study have important implications for the 
criminal justice system. Eyewitness testimony has a significant impact on the final verdict in 
a trial. In real-life cases, police, lawyers, judges, and jurors assess the credibility of child 
witnesses and make the decision as to whether they believe the child or not. It is important 
that the conditions under which this credibility assessment takes place is fair to all parties 
involved in the trial.  In New Zealand, it is possible for a child to present his or her evidence-
in-chief via a pre-recorded interview and for only portions of that interview to be presented to 
the jury.  Despite the prevalence of this practice, there has been minimal research on the 
potential impact of the practice on jurors’ decision-making.  The results from the current 
study clearly show that participants are less likely to believe allegations that contain bizarre 
or implausible details, but at the same time, exposure to these details does not alter their 
belief in a more plausible allegation.  
Under current legislation, when a trial involves a child complainant, the Judge must 
balance the needs of the child against the right of a defendant to have a fair trial when 
deciding whether to allow the child to give his or her evidence via pre-recorded videotape. In 
addition, the Judge also has the jurisdiction to exclude sections of the child’s videotaped 
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evidence from being presented to the jury. Although no one would disagree that there is a 
need to minimise stress on child complainants and to maximise their opportunity to tell their 
story, it is equally important to consider how the presentation of pre-recorded evidence might 
impact on defendants’ right to a fair trial. Legislation in New Zealand and other countries 
allows for a child’s evidence to be truncated for the trial at court. The results of the present 
study indicate that the effect of truncating a child’s evidence does not appear to tip the 
balance away from preserving the right of a defendant to have a fair trial. In the future, 
researchers should continue to explore the effects of truncated testimony on juror decision-






Ackil, J.K. & Zaragoza, M.S. (1998). Memorial consequences of forced confabulation: 
Age differences in susceptibility to false memories. Developmental Psychology, 34, 
1358-1372.  
Bala, N. (1999). Child witnesses in the Canadian criminal courts: Recognizing their 
capacities and needs. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 5, 323-354. 
Bell, B., & Loftus, E. (1985). Vivid persuasion in the courtroom. Journal of Personality 
Assessment, 49, 659-664. 
Bennet, K. (2004). Legal and social issues surrounding closed-circuit and television 
testimony of child victims and witnesses. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & 
Trauma, 8, 233-271.  
Bottoms, B. (1993). Individual differences in perceptions of child sexual assault victims. In 
G. S. Goodman & B. L. Bottoms (Eds.), Child victims, child eyewitnesses: 
Understanding and improving children’s eyewitnesses testimony (pp. 229–261). New 
York: Guilford. 
Bottoms, B., & Goodman, G. (1994). Perceptions of children’s credibility in sexual assault 
cases. Journal of Applied Psychology, 24, 702-732. 
Bottoms, B., Golding, J., Stevenson, M., Wiley, T., & Yozwiak, J. (2007). A review of 
factors affecting jurors’ decisions in child sexual abuse cases. In M. Toglia, J. Read, 
D. Ross, & R. Lindsay (Eds.), The handbook of eyewitness testimony: Volume 1, 
Memory for events (pp. 509–543). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Bottoms, B. L., Golding, J. M., Stevenson, M. C., Wiley, T. R. A., & Yozwiak, J. A. (2007). 
A review of factors affecting jurors’ decisions in child sexual abuse cases. In J. D. 
Read, D. Ross, M. Toglia, & R. Lindsay (Eds.), The psychology of eyewitness memory 
(pp. 509-543). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
66 
 
Bornstein, B. (1999). The ecological validity of jury simulations: Is the jury still out? Law 
and Human Behaviour, 23, 75-91.  
Brennan, M., & Brennan, R. (1988). Strange language: Child victim witnesses under cross-
examination. Wagga Wagga, Australia: CSU Literary Studies Network. 
Bruck, M., & Ceci, S. (1995). Jeopardy in the courtroom. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association.  
Bruck, M., & Ceci, S.J. (1999). The suggestibility of children’s memory. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 50, 419-439. 
Candel, I., Hayne, H., Strange, D., & Prevoo, E. (2009). The effect of suggestion on 
children’s recognition memory for seen and unseen details. Psychology, Crime, & 
Law, 15, 29-39 
Cashmore, J. (1992). The use of closed-circuit television for child witnesses in the ACT. 
Sydney, AU: Australian Law Reform Commission.  
Cashmore, J., & Bussey, K. (1996). Judicial perceptions of child witnesses. Law and Human 
Behaviour, 20, 313-334. 
Cashmore, J., & Trimboli, L. (2006). Child sexual assault trials: A survey of juror 
perceptions. Sydney: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
Retrieved from: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/CJB/cjb102.pdf 
Ceci, S.J., & Bruck, M. (1993). Suggestibility of the child witness: A historical review and 
synthesis. Psychological Bulletin, 113, 403-439. 
Ceci, S. J., Huffman, M. L. C., Smith, E., & Loftus, E. F. (1994). Repeatedly thinking about a 
non-event: Source misattributions among preschoolers. Consciousness and Cognition, 
3, 388-407. 
Connolly, D., & Read. J. (2006). Delayed prosecution of historic child sexual abuse: 




Connolly, D. A., Price, H. L., Lavoie, J. A., & Gordon, H. M. (2008). Perceptions and 
predictors of children’s credibility of a unique event and an instance of a repeated 
event. Law and Human Behaviour, 32, 92-112. 
Connolly, D. A., Price, H. L., & Gordon, H. M. (2010). Judicial decision making in timely 
and delayed prosecutions of child sexual abuse in Canada: A study of honesty and 
cognitive ability in assessments of credibility. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 
16, 177-199. 
Dalenberg, C. (1996). Accuracy, timing and circumstances of disclosure in therapy of 
recovered and continuous memories of abuse. Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 24, 229-
275.  
Davies, E., & Seymour, F. (1997). Child witnesses in the criminal courts: Furthering New 
Zealand's commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 4, 13-24. 
Davies, G. (1992). Influencing public policy on eyewitnessing: Problems and possibilities. In 
F. Losel, D. Bender, & T. Bliesener (Eds.), Psychology and law: International 
perspectives (pp. 265–274). Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Davies, G. (1999). The impact of television on the presentation and reception of children's 
testimony. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 22, 241-256.  
Davies, G., & Noon, E. (1991). An evaluation of the live link for child witnesses. London: UK 
Home Office.  
Davies, G. M., Wilson, C., Mitchell, R., & Milsom, J. (1995). Videotaping children's 





Davies, M., & Rogers, P. (2009). Perceptions of blame and credibility toward victims of 
childhood sexual abuse: Differences across victim age, victim-perpetrator relationship 
and respondent gender in a depicted case. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 18, 78–92.  
Duggan, L., Aubrey, M., Doherty, E., Isquith, P., Levine, M., & Scheiner, J. (1989). The 
credibility of children as witnesses in a simulated child sex abuse trial. In S. J. Ceci, 
D. Ross, & M. P. Toglia (Eds), Perspectives on children’s testimony (pp. 1-22). New 
York, NY: Springer-Verlag.  
Eastwood, C., & Patton, W. (2002). The experiences of child complainants of sexual abuse in 
the criminal justice system. Canberra, AU: Report to the Criminology Research 
Council. Retrieved from: http://www.secasa.com.au/assets/Statstics/the-experiences-
of-child-complainants-of-sexual-abuse-in-the-criminal-justice-system-2002.pdf 
Eaton, T. E., Ball, P. J., & O'Callaghan, M. G. (2001). Child-witness and defendant 
credibility: Child evidence presentation mode and judicial instructions. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 31, 1845-1858. 
Evidence Amendment Act (1989). Retrieved from http://www.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/databases/legislationnz/acts/view/?d1=public/text/1989/an/104.html 
Fivush, R., & Schwarzmueller, A. (1995). Say it again: Effects of repeated interviews on 
young children's event recall. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 8, 555-580. 
Flin, R. (1990). The case for change. In J.R. Spencer & R. Flin (Eds.), The evidence of 
children (pp. 282–305). London: Blackstone.  
Freeman, G.H., & Halton, J.H. (1951). Note on exact treatment of contingency, goodness of 
fit and other problems of significance. Biometrika, 38, 141-149.  
Gabora, N., Spanos, N., & Joab, A. (1993). The effects of complainant age and expert 
psychological testimony in a simulated child sexual abuse trial. Law and Human 
Behaviour, 17, 103-119. 
69 
 
Garven, S., Wood, J., Malpass, R., & Shaw, J. (1998). More than suggestion: The effect of 
interviewing techniques from the McMartin preschool case. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 83, 347-359.  
Golding, J., Sanchez, R., & Sego, S. (1999). Brief research report: Age factors affecting the 
believability of repressed memories of child sexual assault.  Law and Human 
Behavior, 23, 257-268.  
Golding, J. M., Fryman, H. M., & Marsil, D. F. (2003). Big girls don't cry: The effect of child 
witness demeanor on juror decisions in a child sexual abuse trial. Child Abuse & 
Neglect, 27, 1311- 1321. 
Golding, J. M., Dunlap, E. E., & Hodell, E. C. (2009). Jurors’ perceptions of children’s 
eyewitness testimony. In B. L. Bottoms, C. J. Najdowski, & G. S. Goodman (Eds.), 
Children as victims, witnesses, and offenders: Psychological science and the law (pp. 
188-208). New York: Guilford. 
Goodman, G., Bottoms, B., Hersocvici, B., & Shaver, P. (1989). Determinants of the child 
victim’s perceived credibility. In S. Ceci, D. Ross, & M. Toglia (Eds.), Perspectives 
on children’s testimony (pp. 1-22). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 
Goodman, G., Taub, E, Jones, D., England, P., Port, L., Rudy, L., & Prado, L. (1992). 
Testifying in criminal court: Emotional effects on child sexual assault victims. 
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 57, 1-142.  
Goodman, G. S., Tobey, A. E., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., Orcutt, H., Thomas, S., Shapiro, C., 
& Sachsenmaier, T. (1998). Face-to-face confrontation: Effects of closed-circuit 
technology on children's eyewitness testimony and jurors' decisions. Law and Human 
Behaviour, 22, 165-203.  
70 
 
Goodman, G. S., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., Schaaf, J. M., & Kenney, R. (2002). Nearly 4 
years after an event: Children's eyewitness memory and adults' perceptions of 
children's accuracy. Child Abuse & Neglect, 26, 849-884.  
Goodman, G. S., Myers, J. E. B., Qin, J., Quas, J. A., Castelli, P., Redlich, A. D., & Rogers, 
L. (2006). Hearsay versus children's testimony: Effects of truthful and deceptive 
statements on jurors' decisions. Law and Human Behaviour, 30, 363-401. 
Gross, J., Hayne, H., & Poole, A. (2006). The use of drawing in interviews with children: A 
potential pitfall. In J.R. Marrow (Ed.), Focus on child psychology research (pp. 119-
144). New York: Nova Publishers. 
Gupta, T. (1994). Child witnesses – An Australian perspective. Child Abuse Review, 3, 179–
182. 
Hall, S. R., & Sales, B. D. (2008). Courtroom modifications for child witnesses: Law and 
science forensic evaluations. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.  
Hanna, K., Davies, E., Henderson, E., Crothers, C., & Rotherham, C. (2010). Child witnesses 
in the New Zealand criminal courts: A review of practice and implications for policy. 
Auckland, NZ: Institute of Public Policy. 
Hill, P. E., & Hill, S. M. (1987). Videotaping children's testimony: An empirical view. 
Michigan Law Review, 85, 809-833. 
Holliday, R. E., & Hayes, B. K. (2001). Automatic and intentional processes in children’s 
eyewitness suggestibility. Cognitive Development, 16, 617–636 
Jarvis, B.G. (2012). MediaLab (Version 2012) [Computer Software]. New York, NY: 
Empirisoft Corporation. 
Kaufmann, G., Drevland, G. C. B., Wessel, E., Overskeid, G., & Magnussen, S. (2003). The 
importance of being earnest: Displayed emotions and witness credibility. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 17, 21-34. 
71 
 
Klemfuss, J., & Ceci, S. (2009). Normative memory development and the child witness. In K. 
Kuehnle, M. Connell, K. Kuehnle, & M. Connell, (Eds.), The evaluation of child 
sexual abuse allegations: A comprehensive guide to assessment and testimony (pp. 
153-180). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Klettke, B., & Powell, M. (2011). The effects of evidence, coherence, and credential on jury 
decision making in child sexual abuse trials. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 18, 
263-269 
Kohnken, G. (1989). Behavioral correlates of statements credibility: Theories, paradigms, 
and results. In H. Wegener, F. Losel, & H. Jochen (Eds), Criminal behavior and the 
justice system: Psychological perspectives (pp. 271-289). New York: Springer. 
Krähenbühl, S. (2012). ‘Does the jury really need to hear it all?’: the effect of evidence 
presentation practice on jury assessment of children’s eyewitness testimony. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 18, 847-858. 
Kulisek, N.R. (2014). Effects of child age and type of detail reported on credibility of child 
abuse (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from 
http://scholar.utc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&context=theses 
Landström, S., Granhag, P. (2010). In-court versus out-of-court testimonies: Children's 
experiences and adults' assessments. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24, 941-955. 
Landström, S., Granhag, P. A., & Hartwig, M. (2007). Children's live and videotaped 
testimonies: How presentation mode affects observers' perception, assessment and 
memory. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 12, 333-347. 
Lash, B. (1995, February). Time taken to process sexual offence cases through the courts. 
Unpublished report. Ministry of Justice, Wellington, NZ. 
Law Foundation New Zealand. (2010). Child witnesses face more injustice in criminal courts. 
Retrieved from: http://www.lawfoundation.org.nz/?p=659 
72 
 
Leippe, M. R., Manion, A. P., & Romanczyk, A. (1992). Eyewitness persuasion: How and 
how well do fact finders judge the accuracy of adults' and children's memory reports? 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 181-197  
Leippe, M., Manion, A. P., & Romanczyk, A. (1993). Discernability or discrimination? 
Understanding jurors’ reactions to accurate and inaccurate child and adult 
eyewitnesses. In G. S. Goodman & B. Bottoms, (Eds.), Child victims, child witnesses: 
Understanding and improving testimony (pp. 169–201). New York: Guilford.  
Linder, D. (2003). The McMartin Preschool abuse trial: A commentary. Retrieved from: 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mcmartin/mcmartinaccount.html.  
Lyon, T. (2002). Applying suggestibility research to the real world: The case of repeated 
questions. Law and Contemporary Problems, 65, 97-126. 
Mahoney, R., McDonald, E., Optican, S. L., & Tinsley, Y. (2010). The Evidence Act 2006: 
Act & Analysis (2nd edn). Wellington, NZ: Thomson Reuters.  
McDonald, E., & Tinsley, Y. (2011). Evidence issues. The Canterbury Law Review, 17, 123-
159. 
Ministry of Justice. (2014). Alternative pre-trial and trial processes for child witnesses in 









Myers, J. E., Redlich, A., Goodman, G., Prizmich, L., & Imwinkelried, E. (1999). Jurors’ 
perceptions of hearsay in child sexual abuse cases. Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law, 5, 388-419.  
Murray, K. (1995). Live television link: An evaluation of its use by child witnesses in Scottish 
criminal trials. Central Research Unit, The Scottish Home Office. Retrieved from: 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/1998/12/5e1fb1ac-4e60-4c86-9b89-25f989249d3d 
Nathanson, R., & Saywitz, K. J. (2003). The effects of the courtroom context on children's 
memory and anxiety. Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 31, 67-98.  
Nightingale, N. N. (1993). Juror reactions to child victim witnesses: Factors affecting trial 
outcome. Law and Human Behavior, 17, 679-694. 
Nunez, N., Kehn, A., & Wright, D. (2011). When children are witnesses: The effects of 
context, age, and gender on adults’ perceptions of cognitive ability and honesty. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 460-468. 
Nuzzo, R. (2015). Fooling ourselves. Nature, 426, 182-185. Retrieved from 
http://www.nature.com/news/how-scientists-fool-themselves-and-how-they-can-stop-
1.18517 
Orcutt, H., Goodman, G., Tobey, A., Batterman-Faunce, J., & Thomas, S. (2001). Detecting 
deception in children’s testimony: Factfinders’ abilities to reach the truth in open 
court and closed-circuit trials. Law and Human Behavour, 25, 339-372. 
Peace, K. A., Brower, K. L., & Rocchio, A. (2014). Is truth stranger than fiction? Bizarre 
details and credibility assessment. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 30, 38-
49. 
Peterson, C., & Biggs, M. (1997). Interviewing children about trauma: Problems with 
"specific" questions. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 10, 279-290 
74 
 
Pezdek, K., Morrow, A., Blandon-Gitlin, I., Goodman, G. S., Quas, J. A., Saywitz, K. J., . . . 
Brodie, L. (2004). Detecting deception in children: Event familiarity affects criterion-
based content analysis ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 119-126. 
Pipe, M., & Henaghan, M. (1996). Accommodating children’s testimony: Legal reforms in 
New Zealand. Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 23, 145-167 
Poole, D. A. & White, L.T. (1991). Effects of question repetition on the eyewitness testimony 
of children and adults. Developmental Psychology,27, 975-986. 
Poole, D. A., & Lindsay, D. S. (2001). Children’s eyewitness reports after exposure to 
misinformation from parents. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7, 27-50 
Poole, D. A., & Lindsay, D. S. (1995). Interviewing preschoolers: Effects of nonsuggestive 
techniques, parental coaching, and leading questions on reports of nonexperienced 
events. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 60, 129-154. 
Powell, M. B., Wright, R., & Hughes-Scholes, C. H. (2011). Contrasting the perceptions of 
child testimony experts, prosecutors and police officers regarding individual child 
abuse interviews. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 18, 33–43. 
Powell, M., & Thomson, D. (2003). Improving children's recall of an occurrence of a 
repeated event: Is it a matter of helping them to generate options?. Law and Human 
Behavior, 27, 365-384. 
Pozzulo, J., Dempsey, J., & Crescini, C. (2010). Factors affecting juror decisions in historic 
child sexual abuse cases involving continuous memories. Criminal Justice and 
Behaviour, 37, 951-964. 
Quas, J., Malloy, L., Melinder, A., Goodman, G., D'Mello, M., & Schaaf, J. (2007). 
Developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias 




Quas, J., Thompson, W., & Clarke-Stewart, K. (2005). Do jurors “know” what isn’t so about 
child witnesses? Law and Human Behavior, 29, 425-455. 
Quas, J. A., Bottoms, B. L., Haegerich, T. M., & Nysse-Carris, K. L. (2002). Effects of 
victim, defendant and juror gender on decisions in child sexual assault cases. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 32, 1993-2021. 
Redlich, A. D., Myers, J. E., Goodman, G. S., & Qin, J. (2002). A comparison of two forms 
of hearsay in child sexual abuse cases. Child Maltreatment, 7, 312-328. 
Regan, P. C., & Baker, S. J. (1998). The impact of child witness demeanor on perceived 
credibility and trial outcome in sexual abuse cases. Journal of Family Violence, 13, 
187-195. 
Rosenthal, R. (1995). State of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels: An overview. 
  Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 1, 247-271.  
Ross, D., Dunning, D., Toglia, M., & Ceci, S. (1990). The child in the eyes of the jury: 
Assessing mock jurors' perceptions of the child witness. Law and Human Behavior, 
14, 5-23.  
Ross, D., Hopkins, S., Hanson, E., Lindsay, R., Hazen, K., & Eslinger, T. (1994). The impact 
of protective shields and videotape testimony on conviction rates in a simulated trial 
of child sexual abuse. Law and Human Behaviour, 18, 553-566. 
Ross, D., Jurden, F., Lindsay, R., & Keeney, J. (2003). Replications and limitations of a two-
factor model of child witness credibility. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 
418-431.  
Saywitz, K. J., & Nathanson, R. (1993). Children's testimony and their perceptions of stress 
in and out of the courtroom. Child Abuse & Neglect, 17, 613-622.  
Schreiber, N., & Parker, J. F. (2004). Inviting witnesses to speculate: Effects of age and 
interaction on children’s recall. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 89, 31–52. 
76 
 
Schutte, J., & Hosch, H. (1997). Gender differences in sexual assault verdicts: A meta-
analysis. Journal of Social Behavior & Personality, 12, 759-772. 
Scott, J. (1994). Preparation of the child witness for court – A Scottish view. Child Abuse 
Review, 3, 177–179. 
Stromwall, L., Bengtsson, L., Leander, L., & Granhag, P. (2004). Assessing children’s 
statements: the impact of a repeated experience on CBCA and RM ratings. Journal of 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18, 653-668.  
Sutherland, R., & Hayne, H. (2001). Age-related changes in the misinformation effect. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 79, 388-404.  
Swim, J., Borgida, E., & McCoy, K. (1993). Videotaped versus in-court witness testimony: Is 
protecting the child witness jeopardizing due process? Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 23, 603–631  
Talwar, V., & Lee, K. (2002). Development of lying to conceal a transgression: Children's 
control of expressive behaviour during verbal deception. International Journal of 
Behavioral Development, 26, 436-444.  
Talwar, V., Lee, K., Bala, N., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (2006). Adults' judgments of children's 
coached reports. Law and Human Behavior, 30, 561-570. 
Tobey, A., Goodman, G., Batterman-Faunce, J., Orcutt, H., & Sachsenmaier, T. (1995). 
Balancing the rights of children and defendants: Effects of closed-circuit television on 
children’s accuracy and jurors’ perception. In M. Zaragoza, J. Graham, G. Hall, R. 
Hirschman, & Y. Ben-Porath (Eds.), Memory and testimony in the child witness (pp. 
214–239). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Underwager, R., & Wakefield, H. (1992). Poor psychology produces poor law. Law and 
Human Behavior, 16, 233-243. 
Undeutsch, U. (1982). Statements reality analysis. In A. Trankell (Ed.), Reconstructing the 
77 
 
past: The role of psychologists in criminal trial (pp. 27-56). Stockholm: Norstedt and 
Sons. 
Vrij, A. (2002). Deception in children: A literature review and implications for children’s 
testimony. In H. Westcott, G. Davies, & R. Bull, (Eds.), Children’s testimony (pp. 
175–194). Chichester: Wiley.  
Waterman, A., Blades, M., & Spencer, C. (2000). Do children try to answer nonsensical 
questions? British Journal of Developmental Psychology. 18, 211-225.  
Waterman, A., Blades, M., & Spencer, C. (2004). Indicating when you do not know the 
answer: The effect of question format and interviewer knowledge on children’s ‘don’t 
know’ responses. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 22, 335-348.  
Waterman, A., Blades, M., & Spencer, C. (2001). Interviewing children and adults: The 
effect of question format on the tendency to speculate. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
15, 521-531.  
Wells, G.L., & Windschitl, P.D. (1999). Stimulus sampling and social psychological 
experimentation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1115-1125. 
Wright, D., Hanoteau, F., Parkinson, C., & Tatham, A. (2010). Perceptions about memory 
reliability and honesty for children of 3 to 18 years old. Legal and Criminological 
Psychology, 15, 195-207. 
Yozwiak, J. A., Golding, J. M., & Marsil, D. F. (2004). The impact of type of out-of-court 
disclosure in a child sexual assault trial. Child Maltreatment, 9, 325-334. 
Zajaz, R., & Cannan, P. (2009). Cross-examination of sexual assault complainants: A 
developmental comparison. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 16, 36-54. 
Zajac, R., Gross, J., & Hayne, H. (2003). Asked and answered: Questioning children in the 
courtroom. Journal of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 10, 199-209 
78 
 
Zajac, R., & Hayne, H. (2003). I don’t think that’s what really happened: The effect of cross-
examination on the accuracy of children’s reports. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 9, 187-195.  
Zajac, R., O’Neill, S., & Hayne, H. (2012). Disorder in the courtroom? Child witnesses under 
cross-examination. Developmental Review, 21, 181-204. 
Zaragoza, M. S., Dahlgren, D., & Muench, J. (1992). The role of memory impairment in 
children’s suggestibility. In M. L. Howe, C. J. Brainerd, & V. F. Reyna (Eds.), The 




Questions regarding the circumstances of Jasmine’s allegation(s) 
1. *How likely is it that Jasmine made up the allegation(s) against Warren? 
2. How likely is it that Jasmine is telling the truth about the allegation(s) against Warren? 
3. How likely is it that Jasmine honestly believes she was assaulted by Warren when really 
she was not? 
4. How likely is it that Jasmine’s statements were influenced by the specialist interviewer? 
5. #How likely is it that Jasmine reported all the major details about the event(s)? 



















10. How likely is it that Jasmine is afraid to tell everything that happened with Warren? 




12. How likely is it that Jasmine’s memory of the event(s) is affected by stress? 
13. How likely is it that Jasmine confused an earlier abusive experience with what happened 
with Warren? 
14. How likely is it that Jasmine forgot to tell the specialist interviewer about some things 
that happened because she was nervous? 
15. *How likely is it that Jasmine had a motive to make a report against Warren? 
16. *How likely is it that some of the details that Jasmine reported are not accurate? 
17. How likely is it that an adult convinced Jasmine to make a false report against Warren? 




Responses used to compile honesty score 
# 





The core allegation presented to all participants.  
Interviewer:  Okay Jasmine, I’ve been through and pushed the green ‘record’ button 
now, so we can start our talk. And the first thing I’ll do is say what the 
time is. It’s now 9:38am so just after half-past nine in the morning. My 
name is Gina Simmons, but when we’re talking you can just call me 
Gina. And the date today is 20
th
 August 2014, and we’re at Rotorua 
Police Station. And the lady sitting in that other room is our monitor, 
and her name is Kaye Edwards. Her job is to look after the recording 
equipment and take some notes of what we talk about. And after we’ve 
been talking for a while, I’ll go next door and check that everything’s 
working okay and to see if Kaye has any more questions for me to ask 
you. I’ll tell you when I’m going to go and do that, okay?  
Child:   (Nods head) 
Interviewer:  Now, can you tell me your full name? 
Child:   It’s Jasmine…Phillips. 
Interviewer:   Okay, and how old are you, Jasmine? 
Child:   I’m 6.  
Interviewer:  Okay, do you know when your birthday is? 
Child:   It’s on October the 6
th
.  
Interviewer:  Okay, thanks Jasmine. So while we’re talking in here today, if I ask 
you a question and you don’t know what I mean, then you can tell me 
and I’ll think of a different way to ask the question. And it’s okay if 
you don’t know the answer to a question too, okay? You just tell me 
you don’t know. 
Child:   (nods head) 
Interviewer: And if you can’t remember the answer to a question, you just tell me 
that too, okay? 
Child:   Okay. 
Interviewer:  But if you do know the answers to my questions, it’s really important 
that you tell me, okay? Tell me in as much detail as you can, but don’t 
guess anything. Okay?  
Child:   Okay.  
Interviewer: And also, if I’m talking about something that you’ve told me and you 
think I’ve got it wrong or mixed up, it’s important that you stop me 
and you tell me. So, for example, I know your name is Jasmine, but if I 
was to call you Jane by mistake, what would you--? 
Child:   It’s not. 
Interviewer:   It’s not your name? Is your name Jane? 
Child:   No. 
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Interviewer:  Right, you just tell me it’s not your name. Okay?  
Child:   Okay.  
Interviewer:  So if I make a mistake while we’re talking, you just need to stop me 
and tell me straight away, okay? 
Child:   (Nods head) 
Interviewer: Can you tell me what it means when you do this? (demonstrates 
nodding head) 
Child:   It means yeah. 
Interviewer:  Okay. Jasmine, now I see you’re wearing a school uniform today.  
Child:   Yeah. 
Interviewer:  Did you go to school yesterday? 
Child:   Yeah. 
Interviewer:  Okay, so can you tell me everything you did yesterday at school, from 
the time you got there to the time you went home? 
Child: Um… Dad dropped me in the car. And we played before the bell rang. 
Interviewer:  Okay, so tell me all about the playing.  
Child:   Um….with the puzzles.  
Interviewer:   Okay, and you said “we” played, so who do you mean? 
Child:   Sita and Katie. 
Interviewer:  Okay, and who are those people? 
Child:   My friends. In my class.  
Interviewer:  Okay, and what else can you remember about your morning at school 
yesterday? 
Child:   We had stories. The mouse story. 
Interviewer:  Alright then. And can you remember anything else? 
Child:   No. Just that. 
Interviewer:   Nothing else? 
Child:   (Shakes head) 
Interviewer: What does it mean when you shake your head? (demonstrates) 
Child:   No. 
Interviewer:  Okay. So before we keep talking, I need to tell you that the most 
important thing about our time in this room today is that everything 
you tell me is the truth, and that you don’t tell any lies. What does 
telling the truth mean, Jasmine? 
Child:   Um, it means….being…true. 
Interviewer:  And what does telling a lie mean? 
Child:   Being a liar? 
82 
 
Interviewer:  Okay, so let’s practice those words. If someone said you were 9 years 
old, would that be the truth or a lie? 
Child:   I’m 6.  
Interviewer:  So would it be the truth or a lie? 
Child:   That’s a liar. 
Interviewer:  Okay, and if I said you had a blue school uniform on, would that be the 
truth or a lie? 
Child:   A truth. 
Interviewer: Okay. And if someone said you were a boy, would that be the truth or 
a lie? 
Child:   A lie. 
Interviewer:   How come? 
Child:   Um….cos it’s the truth if I’m a girl.  
Interviewer:  Okay, and Jasmine, is it best to tell the truth or tell lies? 
Child:   Best to tell truth.  
Interviewer:   Do you know why? 
Child:   Because it’s good.  
Interviewer:  It’s good, okay. Do you know what a promise means? 
Child:   It means when you promise something.  
Interviewer:   What does it mean? 
Child:   Um….I…. 
Interviewer: Let’s practice that word, shall we? If you promised you’d get me a 
drink of water, what would you do? 
Child:   Um….give it to you? 
Interviewer:  Okay, and if you promised someone that you would tidy your 
bedroom, what would you do? 
Child:   Uh…tidy it.  
Interviewer:  Okay, so do you keep a promise or do you break a promise? 
Child:   You keep it.  
Interviewer:  Okay, so Jasmine, do you make me a promise that everything you tell 
me is the truth?  
Child:   Yeah. 
Interviewer: Okay, thank you. So what have you come here to tell me about today? 
Child:   The thing with Warren.  
Interviewer:  Okay, so tell me everything you can remember about that, and don’t 
leave anything out.  
Child:   He’s bad to the kids.  Um…he makes us mad. 
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Interviewer:  Tell me more about that.  What did he do to make you mad? 
Child:   He is mean. He….um….he’s always mean.  I don’t like him. 
Interviewer:    What does he do that’s mean? 
Child:   He hurts us kids. 
Interviewer:    Can you tell me more about that? 
Child:   He hitted me.  He hits me all the time. 
Interviewer:   He hit you? Can you tell everything about when he hit you? 
Child: In toilets…in the school toilets.  He came in…um… and he came in 
and he hitted me. 
Interviewer:  Where did he hit you? 
Child:   In the toilet! I just said! 
Interviewer: I’m sorry Jasmine.  You did say that.  I meant where on your body did 
he hit you? 
Child: My leg.   He hitted it and he…um…it hurt me. Because…and 
because…it was really sore.  
Interviewer:  When he hit you on the leg, tell me all about that. 
Child:   [points to the window] What’s happening out there?  
Interviewer: Jasmine, you don’t need to worry about what is happening outside.  I 
think someone is mowing the lawn.  Can you tell me more about when 
Warren hit you on your leg? 
Child: I was in the toilet. Because…because  I felt sick. And…um…I went to 
the toilets. And…he…he hitted me there. In the…in the toilets.   
Interviewer:  How did that make you feel? 
Child:   My leg hurt. It hurt. Lots and lots, it did. Really hurt.  
Interviewer:  And what happened next, Jasmine? 
Child:   My leg still hurted. 
Interviewer:  What did he hit you with? 
Child: On my leg. He whacked it. With his hand. On my leg, here [points]. 
Like, whack. It really hurt my leg.   
Interviewer: Was his hand like this [interviewer shows open hand], or like this 
[interviewer shows closed fist] or some other way? 
Child: It was like this [child shows closed fist] and it made my leg hurt heaps 
and heaps, it did. 
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Interviewer:  Did you notice anything about your leg after he hit you with his fist? 
Child:   [child nods head] 
Interviewer:  What did you notice? 
Child:   ummmmmm [Pause] I’m going to ballet after this. 
Interviewer: That sounds like good fun.  Jasmine, can you tell me if you noticed 
anything about your leg after Warren hit you with his fist? 
Child:   It was sort of purpley.   
Interviewer:  Do you mean your leg was purple? 
Child: The sore bit. Here [points] on my leg. Just here. That bit there. Right 
there. 
Interviewer:  Was your leg purple for a short time or a long time or something else? 
Child:   Ages. I cried. I cried a lot…uh…after he did that.  
Interviewer:  Did Warren say anything when he hit your leg? 
Child:   He…uh…said mean things.   
Interviewer: Can you remember exactly what he said, Jasmine?  Can you tell me 
what he said? 
Child:   He doesn’t like kids.  He said that. [inaudible] He said it. 
Interviewer:  And Jasmine, what happened after you were in the toilet? 
Child:   I ran away. He hitted me and so I ran away. 
Interviewer:   Jasmine, has the hitting happened one time or more than once? 
Child:   Just that time.  That time he was mean to me in the toilet. 
Interviewer:  Is there anything else you want to tell me about that, Jasmine? 






Additional allegation 1 for Experiment 1. 
Interviewer:   Jasmine, I know that you are a bit tired, but I need to ask you just a few 
more questions, okay? 
Child:   Uhh…okay. 
Interviewer:  Is there anything else you want to tell me today? 
Child:   He [inaudible] in…in the cupboard….where the brooms are. 
Interviewer: Pardon? Can you speak up for me, Jasmine? What happened in the 
cupboard? 
Child: He locked it. We…um…we were in there. And he…he went and 
locked us there. 
Interviewer:  Who locked you in the cupboard? 
Child: Warren.  With the brooms.  He locked us where…where…he keeped 
the brooms.  In the dark. 
Interviewer:  Warren locked you in the cupboard with the brooms? 
Child:   hmmmmmm 
Interviewer:  Jasmine, can you tell me more about when that happened? 
Child:   He grabbed us…us kids. 
Interviewer:  He grabbed you? 
Child:   hmmmmmmm 
Interviewer:  Who was with you? 
Child:   Jack and…um…maybe Ruby. 
Interviewer: Warren grabbed you and Jack and Ruby and locked you in the 
cupboard with the brooms? 
Child:   He doesn’t like us kids.  He’s mean. He’s a mean man. 
Interviewer:  Who was with you, Jasmine? 
Child:   I told you! Jack and maybe Ruby.  Yeah, I think Ruby. 
Interviewer:  How did it make you feel when he locked you in the cupboard? 
Child:   We all cried. And we were really scared.   
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Interviewer:  What happened in the cupboard? 
Child:   We cried there.   
Interviewer:  Where is the cupboard that you’re talking about, Jasmine? 
Child:   At my school. Near the toilets. The toilets for girls. The girls’ ones.  
Interviewer:  What else can you tell me? 
Child:   It was dark.  Um…and I don’t like it.  And he was mean. 
Interviewer:  Did Warren say anything when he locked you in the cupboard? 
Child: He said…um…he said “Don’t tell or I will hit you with a broom.” He 
yelled that to me. “DON’T TELL!”…like that. 
Interviewer:  How long were you in the cupboard? 
Child:   A long time. Really long.  
Interviewer:  And what happened after that? 
Child:   He let us out and we ran away. 
Interviewer: You ran away? Okay. And did this happen in the morning or afternoon 
or some other time? 
Child:   Yeah. It did. And…um… [child walks away] 
Interviewer: Jasmine, can you come back here and sit next to me?  We are almost 
done.  
Interviewer:  [Child returns].  Thank you, Jasmine. 
Interviewer: Can you tell me anything else you can remember about the time 
Warren locked you in the broom cupboard? 
Child:   He locked us in there.  Me and Jack and Ruby. 
Interviewer:  And do Jack and Ruby go to school with you? 
Child: In my class. It’s Room 6. Mrs Henderson. Do you know her? She has 
stickers.  
Interviewer: No, I don’t know her, but she sounds nice. Jasmine, is there anything 
else you can tell me about that time in the broom cupboard? 
Child:   It was dark. And scary. 




Child:   Just once. At my school.  





Additional allegation 2 for Experiment 1. 
Interviewer: Jasmine, is there anything else that you can tell me about the things 
that happened with Warren? 
Child:   [inaudible] 
Interviewer:  Pardon? Can you speak up so that my microphone can hear you? 
Child: I have a dog. Coco. He’s so hairy. Mum says “he’s too hairy!” He 
leaves hair places. Everywhere. On the couch. And everywhere, like on 
my bed. 
Interviewer: Hmmmmm.  I know that you’re tired, Jasmine, but it is important that 
we do these questions.  Can you tell me anything else about Warren? 
Child:   About the time…..ummm….about the time he took me in the car? 
Interviewer:  The car?  Can you tell me about that? 
Child:   He grabbed me.  Put me…um…putted me in the car. 
Interviewer:  He grabbed you and put you in the car? 
Child:   Yeah. 
Interviewer:  Where were you when he grabbed you? 
Child: In the playground. At the school playground. Like on the swing and 
slides. 
Interviewer:  Can you tell me more about when Warren grabbed you? 
Child:   He- he…grabbed me and drove in his car. 
Interviewer:  His car?  What kind of car, do you know? 
Child: Green. It’s not really a car. It’s a truck.  A big truck, like a- a- green 
one. Toyota, a bit like my Dad’s one.  
Interviewer:  What else can you tell me about that time you went in the car? 
Child: He grabbed me and put me in his car and drove me…um…and [pause] 
there was a cave.  A big dark cave.  His friends were there. They were 
laughing.  And sticks, throwing sticks.  Mean friends. 
Interviewer:  Jasmine, can you tell me who else was there? 
Child:   Warren and…um…some friends. He had mean mean friends there.   
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Interviewer:  Did you recognise any of his friends?  Have you seen them before? 
Child:   I don’t like them. They’re not good. They…they’re not nice.  
Interviewer:  How many friends were there?   
Child:   Heaps. Three. 
Interviewer:  Do you know their names?   
Child: I think one was called….Butch and maybe…Smokey.  In the cave.  
And throwing the sticks. 
Interviewer:    What did the other men look like? 
Child: Like mean men. And one had like a mean man beard.  I think he 
smelled bad. Like poos. [giggles] 
Interviewer: Jasmine, can you remember what the men were wearing?  What were 
their clothes like?  
Child: One was…um…dressed like a wizard.  Uh…the other man had a 
sword. [child motions as if sword-fighting]  
Interviewer:    Jasmine, what did the men do? 
Child: They said mean things and…um…threw some sticks. And the man 
with the sword hit me on the head. And I- I- bleeded a bit. 
Interviewer:  Can you tell me more about what they were doing? 
Child:   [Pause] 
Interviewer:  Anything else about that, Jasmine? 
Child:   [inaudible] 
Interviewer:  What did you say, Jasmine? Speak up for me please? 
Child:   Taking a picture. 
Interviewer:  Who took pictures? Did Warren take pictures? 
Child:   [Pause] The mean men took pictures.  And…um…they did laughing.   
Interviewer:  They were laughing and taking pictures. How did that make you feel? 
Child: I felt mad. And sad.  And I said where’s my mum. And I want my 
mum.  
Interviewer:  What happened next? 
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Child:   We stayed there and then we…we… we went back. 
Interviewer:  You went back where? 






Additional allegation 1 for Experiment 2. 
Interviewer:   Is there anything else that Warren did to you? 
Child:    He made me go in the bath with him 
Interviewer:   He made you go in the bath with him? 
Child:    Mym 
Interviewer:   Whereabouts was the bath? 
Child:    Upstairs 
Interviewer:   Upstairs: Whereabouts? 
Child:    It was up, I don’t know, it was upstairs in some room. 
Interviewer:   Yeah 
Child:    But I don’t know, Oh I don’t know where exactly it was. 
Interviewer:   Yeah, was it at the school or somewhere else? 
Child:    It was at his house 
Interviewer:   Oh at his house.  So he made you have a bath with him at his house? 
Child:    Yeah 
Interviewer:   And who was there when you had a bath with Warren? 
Child:    His friends 
Interviewer:   Oh, hmmmm.  What were his friends’ names? 
Child:    Why are you asking? 
Interviewer:   Why am I asking? 
Child:    Yeah 
Interviewer:   Well, why do think that I want to know that? 
Child:    Yeah, well, I don’t know them 
Interviewer:   Oh, you don’t know the names of the friends? 
Child:   No but the there’s there his friends names um I think one of the their 
friends names starts with R 
92 
 
Interviewer:   With R? 
Child:    Yeah 
Interviewer:  Yeah and what did it sound like, what was, what does the name sound 
like? 
Child:    Mym, I don’t know.  I can’t remember.  Something like Robert. 
Interviewer:   Robert, hmmm.  What did he look like? What did Robert look like? 
Child:    Hmmm, I think one of his friends was old and had a beard. 
Interviewer:   Hmmm, and what colour was the beard? 
Child:    Grey 
Interviewer:   It was a grey beard and he was old? 
Child:    I think so anyhow 
Interviewer:   Yeah.  What sort of clothes did he wear? 
Child:    Oh. 
Interviewer:   You remember anything about his clothes or not? 
Child:    No, just like normal 
Interviewer:   Hmmm. 
Child:    Clothes like old people wear, grey clothes. 
Interviewer:   Were they shorts or trousers or 
Child:    Trousers 
Interviewer:   So when you had a bath upstairs with Warren,  
Child:    Mym 
Interviewer:   What was his friend doing? 
Child:    Um ah, I think he was just up and around 
Interviewer:   Mym 
Child:    He was being smart with some other children 
Interviewer:   Which children were they? 
Child:    I can’t remember, but other children 
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Interviewer:   Okay, so how did you, so what made you have a bath with Warren? 
Child:    He made me 
Interviewer:    He made you? 
Child:    Yep 
Interviewer:  Tell me how he made you have a bath with him. What did he do to 
make you? 
Child:    If I didn’t have a bath with him, he’d say he’d make me 
Interviewer:   How would he do that? 
Child:    By getting me undressed 
Interviewer:  Mym, hmmm.  So how did your clothes when you were in the bath, 
when you were in the bath, whereabouts were your clothes? 
Child:    They were on the floor 
Interviewer:   Right and how did they get on the floor? 
Child:    That was when I took them off 
Interviewer:   Yeah 
Child:    That’s when I took them off 
Interviewer:   Okay and where whereabouts were Warren’s clothes? 
Child:    Um, his clothes were like on the floor 
Interviewer:   Yeah, how did they get off? 
Child:    He took them off 
Interviewer:  Im, hmm, what was the water like in the bath? Was is cold water or hot 
water or…? 
Child:    Hot 
Interviewer:   Normal bath water or? 
Child:    Medium size 
Interviewer:   Medium and what did you do in the bath? 
Child:   He ah he made me eat his poos, and no no, he made me um, yeah he 
made me eat my poos and then he said next time you come here I’ll eat 
mine and he didn’t 
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Interviewer:   Im 
Child:    He tricked me 
Interviewer:   What did the poos taste like? 
Child:    Yuck 
Interviewer:   What did you feel like when he made you eat his poos? 
Child:    Sad. 
Interviewer:   Your poos.  You felt sad. 
Child:    Sad 
Interviewer:   So how did he make you eat it? 
Child:    If I didn’t eat it….he would do it himself when he got a whole load 
Interviewer:   So how many times did you have a bath with Warren? 
Child:    About twice 
Interviewer:  And what happened after he made the poos go in your mouth? What 
happened after that? 






Additional allegation 2 for Experiment 2. 
Interviewer:  Is there anything else that you can tell me? 
Child:   Um well, he took me to the library building? 
Interviewer:  Yeah 
Child:   And ah there was a trap door there 
Interviewer:  There was a trap door? Yeah. What colour was the building? 
Child:   Grey 
Interviewer:  Could you draw the building for me? 
Child:   Yeah, but where’s a different one….I get bored with….. 
Interviewer:  So how did Warren take you to the building? How did you get there? 
Child:   In the car 
Interviewer:  Hmmm.  Who drove the car? 
Child:   Warren 
Interviewer: Warren drove it.  And where did he, where did, where were you before 
he put you in the car, where would he take you from? 
Child: Um a he he didn’t go anywhere, he just said he was going for a walk 
and um, he really went to the house and his mother was there. 
Interviewer:  So, you’re talking about the house or this building here? 
Child:   On no I talking about…. 
Interviewer:  Okay so there were 
Child:   And in the house, his mother was there 
Interviewer:  At this building was the trap door 
Child:   Yeah 
Interviewer:  What did his mother look like? 
Child:   Oh she was all grey 
Interviewer:  Yeah 
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Child: She wore grey clothes and she had hair like my bushy hair with a bit of 
curls. 
Interviewer:  Hmm and how did you know that it was his mother? 
Child:   Cos he told me 
Interviewer: Okay, so whereabouts was the building with the trap door, was it do 
you know where it was? Was it close to the shops or to the school? 
Child:   Mym, it was close to the shops 
Interviewer:  Which shops? 
Child:   Oooooh, I don’t know, it was a shop though 
Interviewer: And there was, you mentioned something about a library.  What was 
the bit about the library? 
Child:   Ah, the library had a trap door on it 
Interviewer:  Oh, okay 
Child: And there was these books and he tried to make me grow up and hurt 
children 
Interviewer:  The books said that? 
Child:   Yes. 
Child:   He made us step through the trap door, it was open about ah that deep. 
Interviewer:  Yeah 
Child:   And then and he took some of the kids to his mother’s house 
Interviewer:  Hmmmm 
Child: And that was on the hills….and it was well they were there…they left 
us in the trap door for half an hour and while he went to grandmother’s 
house for half an hour. 
Interviewer:  I see 
Child: And left us in the trap door on our own. And he took us to the pool and 
dropped us in the pool. 
Interviewer:  Im hym, did anything else happen in the trap door? 
Child:   No, we just stood around and waited 
Interviewer:  Who let you out? 
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Child:   Warren came back. 
Interviewer:  Hmmmmm….did he say anything when he came back or not? 
Child:   He said lots of swear words? 
Interviewer:  Yeah and and what happened when he came? Warren let you out? 
Child: Yeah and he said if if you’ll tell…..um I’ll leave you in here for ever 
and never come back and get you. 
Interviewer: And were there other adults at that building with the library and the 
trap door? 
Child:   Yeah, 20 of his friends.  Hatchet and Smellyhead 
Interviewer:  Hatchet and smellyhead: 
Child:   Yeah, but that wasn’t their real names.  I knew.  I know that. 
Interviewer: So what did Warren do to you at the trap door building? Which room  
he hurt you in? 
Child: Which room did he hurt me in, um why one of the rooms where no one 
was in on the second floor. 
Interviewer:  What did he do to you, to hurt you?  
Child: What did he do to hurt me? Oh well he kicked me and punched me and 
stuck a sharp stick up my bum. 
Interviewer:  Which part of your bum did the stick go? 
Child:   In the, in the poos hole 
Interviewer:  What did it feel like on your poo hole? 
Child:   It feeled, made it bleed 
Interviewer:  Where did the blood go? 
Child: On the floor and he done and he cleaned it up and he done that five 
times and he stuck a burning piece of paper up my bum five times, so 
that means it bleed um 10 times 
Interviewer:  And who was there when he stick a stick up your bum? 
Child: Um his mother, no his friend stuck thi um um burning paper and 
Warren. 
Interviewer:  Who did the burning paper? 
98 
 
Child: Um, his friends and he and so his friends on the sharp stick and the 
burning paper and Warren and his mum were taking photos and while 
bum was bleeding, they were laughing. 
Interviewer:  What did you feel like? 
Child:   Just sad because it wasn’t funny at all. 
Interviewer:  Did the blood go anywhere else or not 
Child:   No….on the flippen floor. 
Interviewer:  Okay, so what did the stick look like? Where did it come from? 
Child: It was in some like a treasure box with all the paper and it was, it was 
like it was a treasure box and um that they made out of wood and they 
and they put about oh god knows, 20 pieces of paper in that box and 
they put a lighter and um about five sharp sticks and then they shut the 
thing and locked it. 
Interviewer:  Where did they keep the box? 
Child:   In the secret cupboard. 
Interviewer:  And who was in charge of the secret cupboard? 
Child:   Oh, one of them, the leader was Smellyhead.  It wasn’t his real name. 
Interviewer:  What did Smellyhead look like? 
Child:   He had a bald head. 
Interviewer:  He was bald? 
Child:   Well, he was bald, with hairy hands like one of my adult friends. 
Interviewer:  Okay, thank you Jasmine.  I think we are all done. 
 
 
 
 
